Participation, Image and Likeness: A Comparative Demonstration of the Scriptural and Philosophical Basis of Origen’s Theology of Deification by Doeing, Matthew J.
Providence College 
DigitalCommons@Providence 
Theology Graduate Theses Theology 
2020 
Participation, Image and Likeness: A Comparative Demonstration 
of the Scriptural and Philosophical Basis of Origen’s Theology of 
Deification 
Matthew J. Doeing 
Providence College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/theology_graduate_theses 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons 
Doeing, Matthew J., "Participation, Image and Likeness: A Comparative Demonstration of the Scriptural 
and Philosophical Basis of Origen’s Theology of Deification" (2020). Theology Graduate Theses. 16. 
https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/theology_graduate_theses/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Theology at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theology Graduate Theses by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact dps@providence.edu. 
 
Participation, Image and Likeness: A Comparative 
Demonstration of the Scriptural and Philosophical Basis of 












Matthew J. Doeing 
Providence College M.A. in Theology Program 












Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction and Premise of the Present Work ........................................................1 
Origen of Alexandria: His Life and Legacy 
A Brief Biography........................................................................................4 
Origen as Scriptural Exegete and The Central Themes of His Writings  ....9 
Deification in Platonism ........................................................................................14 
Deification in Early Christianity ............................................................................21 
II. Origen and the Human Person: Origen’s Theological Anthropology as Fulfilled 
in the “Image of God” and Likeness to the Divine 
Origen on the Human Soul: Platonist, Christian or Both?  ....................................25 
The Pauline Elements in Origen’s Theological Anthropology  .............................35 
III. Origen and the Role of the Logos .............................................................................53 
IV. Unpacking Deification’s Role as Doctrine in Origen’s Theological Framework 
Origen’s Terminology of Deification ....................................................................59 
Participation in the Divine .....................................................................................61 
Origen and the Role of the Holy Spirit ..................................................................67 
The Johannine and Pauline Emphasis in Origen’s Doctrine of Deification ..........70 
Origen’s Theodicy: The Role of Evil in the Journey of the Soul ..........................76 
V. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................80 







I. Introduction and Premise of the Present Work 
 
“‘May you too be a partaker and ever increase the participation, that you may say not only, ‘We have 
become partakers of Christ’ (Heb. 3:14), but also, ‘We have become partakers of God.’’ (Philocalia 13.4; 
trans. Lewis, modified).1  These words, written by Origen to his former pupil, Gregory Thaumaturgus, 
convey an idea that would, unlike other of Origen’s theological propositions, survive the rough waters of 
ecclesiastical scrutiny in which the early Church was submerged.  Here an answer to the question of 
man’s intended relationship with God is presented: that Christ has been made man so that men may 
become gods, in other words, deification.  Although deification is a theological concept that has not 
always remained in universal popularity among theologians, its presence in Christian thought, and 
particularly among the Church Fathers, is undeniable.2   
In relation to the above, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the sources underlying Origen’s 
theology of deification.  Specifically, this thesis explores the concepts of participation, image and likeness 
“to” or “in” God, along with their derived theological or philosophical meanings and usages, in Origen’s 
writings, in order to argue for the uniquely scriptural characteristics of Origen’s theology of deification.  
Origen of Alexandria, like other Christian thinkers of his era and cultural milieu, was determined to 
contribute to the authentic teaching tradition of the Church while “filling in the gaps” with the best that 
his philosophically imbued academic environment had to offer.  A main objective of the discussion then, 
is to determine the extent to which Origen allowed philosophical concepts and terminology to affect his 
theological outlooks when interpreting Scripture and where he was consciously implementing these 
 
1As quoted in Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 141. 
2 See, e.g., Roger E. Olson, “Deification in Contemporary Theology” Theology Today, vol. 64 (2007): 186 – 200 as 
well as the Preface to Russell’s The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. 
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influences.  Complementing this goal is the exploration of how Origen extrapolated the theme of 
deification from scripture, and which parts of scripture were foremost linked to his thinking on this 
subject. 
In this regard, this paper draws upon various sources, all of which are connected via Platonism, as 
sources of comparison for Origen’s thought.  These sources deal with elements related to the concept of 
deification, as found in Platonism, Middle-Platonism, and Neoplatonism.  Thus, in addition to discussing 
Origen’s own philosophical and theological content we have brought in the following for comparison: (i) 
a short treatment of Plato’s own works, which serves as a look at the foundation of deification in later 
Platonist writing, (ii) comparisons with Philo, especially in regards to Philo’s conception of the soul, the 
image of God, the Logos, and likeness to God, and (iii) comparisons with Plotinus, particularly in regard 
to likeness, participation and Plotinus’ conception of evil.   
In establishing the above thinkers as sources for comparison, we can now properly introduce the 
role of another person in this study, Paul, in relation to Origen’s exegesis of Scripture and the terms of 
deification described above.  Concentration will be placed on Origen’s references to and interpretations of 
Paul’s writings in that Paul’s terminology and theology deeply influenced Origen’s theology, preaching 
and teaching.3  In fact, the use of Paul as Origen’s “exegetical lens” is threefold.  First, Origen took quite 
deeply to Paul’s writings.  As Christoph Markschies points out, “Origen is convinced that Paul is ‘a 
teacher of the Church’ and that to differ from Paul is to ‘aid the enemies of Christ’ (HomEx 5.1).”4  It can 
be said that Paul’s influence on Origen increased during the last twenty years of his life, particularly in his 
 
3 Christoph Markschies, “Paul the Apostle,” The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed., John Anthony McGuckin, 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 167. 
4 Ibid., 168. 
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writing of multiple commentaries on Paul’s epistles,5 the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans being 
the only one of Origen’s biblical commentaries to survive in a coherent form from beginning to end.6    
This brings us to our second reason for our choice of focus on Pauline theology: Paul’s theology 
not only provides a point of reference by which to evaluate the degree to which Origen followed the lead 
of Scripture in his theology of deification but it is also comparable to Platonic anthropology.  For his part, 
Van Kooten claims that, “the significant terminological similarities between Paul and Plotinus, must be 
due, in no small part, to a shared philosophical heritage,” and thus goes on to compare Paul and Plotinus’ 
evaluations of the “inner man” to quite an extent.7 
Lastly, the third reason for examining Paul from Origen’s perspective is that the themes of 
participation, image and likeness are readily apparent in Paul.  Thus we can also speak of deification, in a 
certain sense, in Paul: “an exclusive focus on sin and deliverance would suppress a crucial aspect of 
Paul’s teaching: gaining an ability to discern the will of God, and being transformed into Christlikeness, 
which can truly be called theosis.”8 Therefore this paper will take the position of defending Origen’s 
reading of an inherent theology of deification in Paul, which Paul supports through his usage of themes of 
participation and likeness to Christ.  Origen’s reading of Paul will be furthermore explored through his 
relating of Paul to other scriptural texts and themes, specifically the Gospel of John and the Logos, and 
how this supports Origen’s reading of deification in both Paul and other biblical texts.  Building on this, 
the discussion will allow us to bear fruit in determining how Origen depicts deification by means of 
Paul’s theological anthropology and Johannine Christology.    
 
5 Ibid., 167. 
6 Thomas P. Scheck, “Introduction,” in Origen — Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5, trans., 
Thomas P. Scheck, The Fathers of the Church Vol. 103, (Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2001), 1. 
7 Ibid., 370. 
8 Stephen Finlan, “Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul,” Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and 
Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed., Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. Wittung, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 78. 
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May it hopefully go without saying that the goal of this study is not to convince that Origen takes 
from the scriptures without adding to or developing them in innovative ways or that he in no way borrows 
from Platonic traditions; these assertions, of course, would be met with failure from the start.  However, 
given Origen’s emphasis on the centrality of scripture to the Christian life (he identifies “the ‘deeper 
sense of the Scriptures,” as the “ultimate goal of all theological teachers”9) and given his preoccupation 
with Paul, as identified above, the author of this thesis feels that an investigation into the scriptural basis 
of Origen’s doctrine of deification can yield much fruit in regard to an understanding of Origen’s overall 
theology, as well as modern day interpretations of scripture.  With this in mind, the author intends to 
discern Origen’s use of Platonic terminology and concepts in so much as they unpack central Pauline and 
biblical themes of participatory union with Christ or, as Origen would likely emphasize more readily in 
this context, the Logos.  Such a study would additionally be beneficial in contributing to the discussion on 
deification as a legitimate and scripturally derived doctrine of the early Church, furthermore of its 
development by various Church thinkers, of the effects of Platonic philosophy on said development, and 









9 Markschies, “Paul the Apostle,” 168. 
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Origen of Alexandria, or Adamantius, as he was sometimes called, 10 was one of the most 
prominent and influential Christian thinkers of his time.  Having been born and raised in 
Alexandria, where there existed a thriving scene of theological and philosophical speculation,11 
his theological outlook combined a well-rounded grasp of Middle Platonism12 and an exuberant 
love for all things Church, particularly God’s holy scriptures.  An early in-depth look at Origen’s 
life and Christian witness has been handed down to us by Eusebius of Caesarea.  As Heine 
relates, however, one must exercise caution in treating Eusebius’ chronicle as an authentic 
depiction of Origen’s activities.  Not only does it have apologetic purposes, what with Eusebius 
having used the Apology for Origen as a source and being a “devoted Origenist,” but much of it 
was also written via unconfirmed sources and hearsay.13 For our purposes here, Eusebius’ 
account, corrected where necessary, will be enough to relate a general account of Origen’s early 
upbringing and background, in that “the following assertions about Origen’s youth can be 
accepted as quite probably factual, based on their harmony with Origen’s later achievements.”14  
 
10See Ronald E. Heine, “Introduction,” in Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, trans., Ronald E. Heine, The 
Fathers of the Church Vol. 71, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 28-29; 
Benjamin P. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: Origen’s Doctrine of the Soul, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2012), 3, as well as Eusebius, The Church History 6.14 trans., Paul L. Maier, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1999), 218. 
11 McGuckin, ed., The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 3. 
12 Blosser, Become Like the Angels,17, 18. 
13 Heine, “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 3-8. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
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The later details of Origen’s travels and career in Palestine lean more heavily on McGuckin’s 
and Heine’s research, although they still rely upon Eusebius’ account. 
As Eusebius relates, Origen displayed a fiery zeal to do God’s bidding from his youth.  
As a prime example, Eusebius relates an account of Origen attempting to join his father Leonides 
in martyrdom.  Origen, upon learning that his father had been imprisoned during the persecution 
of Emperor Septimus Severus, which probably occurred sometime around 203 A.D, was only 
prevented from rushing out to his own martyrdom by his mother’s hiding of her son’s clothes, 
thus forcing the young Origen to stay at home.15   
Yet, besides a hearty willingness for martyrdom, we are also told by Eusebius that the 
young Origen studied sacred Scripture “excessively.”   This was both due to his own inclination 
and at the behest of his father, who “insisted that he not devote time to the usual curriculum until 
he has mastered sacred studies each day through memorization and repetition.”16  It appears that 
as early as during this academic formation is when Origen started developing his allegorical 
approach to Scripture.17  Eusebius relates further that after Leonides’ martyrdom, Origen 
continued his secular studies with great enthusiasm until at the age of eighteen he became head 
of the catechetical school in Alexandria.18  Origen was perhaps also a student of Clement at some 
point although we cannot accept Eusebius’ claim that Clement also headed the same catechetical 
school. 19   There is additionally evidence that Origen was in fact a student of the Platonist 
 
15Eusebius, The Church History 6.2.  
16 Ibid., 6:2 (Maier, 208). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Heine, citing Pierre Nautin, relates, however, that Origen was approximately twenty-six rather than eighteen when 
he became head of the school. Heine, Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 9 
19 G. Bardy “Aux origenes de l’ecole d’Alexandrie.” Reserches de science religieuse 27 (1937) :65-90 as cited in 




philosopher Ammonius Saccas, who also taught Plotinus.20  Either way, during this time, Origen 
apparently attracted a great many followers through his teaching, at least one of whom he would 
accompany to their own martyrdom.21 
 Although Origen did not actually learn Hebrew to a great extent, it is also likely that in 
Alexandria, he met and learned from a Christian Jew from Palestine who was living there at the 
time.  Origen refers to this person as “the Hebrew” and it is he who could be partly responsible 
for Jewish influences on Origen’s works.22  Origen was also greatly influenced by Philo, who 
was active in Alexandria from 15 B.C. to A.D.50.23  Origen is indebted to Philo for his method 
of allegorical exegesis, as well as his theological and philosophical motifs.24  In these respects, it 
is not doubtful that Origen’s views on the central concepts of this thesis, namely participation, 
image and likeness and their relation to deification, were influenced by Philonic sources.  
Therefore, Philo’s influence will be briefly dealt with later on in discussing Origen’s exegetical 
approach, his sources, and the central themes of his writings. 
 Eventually, Origen drew away from his teaching of secular studies and began to focus 
primarily on theology and philosophy – handing off his teaching duties to his pupil Heraclas, 
who would himself later go on to become the archbishop of Alexandria.25  This handing off of 
teaching duties, however, may also have been a reorganization of the school initiated by the 
current bishop of Alexandria, Demetrius.  If so, it could have been a way for Demetrius to 
control Origen’s rising influence as a philosopher-theologian.26  It is quite possible that around 
 
20 McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 5. 
21 Eusebius, The Church History 6.3-5. 
22 Heine, “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 11. 
23 David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria,” The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed., John Anthony McGuckin, 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004),  169. 
24 Ibid., 170. 
25 McGuckin., The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 7. 
26 Heine., “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 12-13. 
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this time, most likely between 222 and 229, Origen began composing his Commentary on 
Genesis and On First Principles, as Eusebius confirms for us, both of which would have the 
effect of damaging his relation with Demetrius.27  It is also evident that Origen was dictating his 
Commentary on John during his time at Alexandria, as we may understand from his own words: 
Although the storm at Alexandria seemed to oppose us, we dictated the words which were given 
us as far as the fifth book, since Jesus rebuked the wind and waves of the sea.  But after we had 
proceeded for a while in the sixth book we were rescued from the land of Egypt, when the God 
who led his people from Egypt delivered us. 
  
At that time, when the enemy had overrun us most bitterly by his new writings which were truly 
hostile to the gospel, and when he had stirred up all the perverse winds in Egypt against us, reason 
summoned me to take a stand in the struggle and guard my ruling principle, so that wicked 
thoughts could not also introduce the storm into my soul.  I chose to do this rather than continue 




 A little later in this passage Origen makes it even more clear that he had dictated his first 
five books on the Commentary of John in Alexandria when he says: “And be aware that I make 
this second beginning of the sixth book very eagerly because what we dictated previously in 
Alexandria, for some reason or other, has not been brought.”29  What was the reason for this 
“storm” at Alexandria?  Given Origen’s reputation as a teacher and scholar through which he 
 
27 Ibid., 14.  Heine, citing Nautin, explains that Origen’s allegorization of the creation story did not sit well with 
Demetrius.  Thus, Origen wrote On First Principles as a defense of his methodology, the result of which was 
perhaps the unintended and unwanted effect that Demetrius’ suspicions of Origen’s “heterodoxy” were “confirmed.” 
See also Eusebius, The Church History 6.23-24.  
28 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John Books 1-10, 6.8-9. The translation used is that by Ronald E. 
Heine, Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John Books 1-10, The Fathers of the Church 80 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 170. 
29 Ibid., 171. 
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became “prosperous, great and esteemed by all,”30 we can possibly infer from Eusebius’ account 
that Bishop Demetrius found some fault with Origen’s pedagogy.31 If this were the case, 
Origen’s philosophical speculations, his emerging Logos theology and allegorizing approaches 
to Scripture could be to blame for leading him into deep water in the “anti-intellectual” 
Alexandrian ecclesial environment.32 
 Whatever the cause, eventually the tension between the two Churchmen came to a head.  
After a brief stint in Arabia,33 Origen left Alexandria for Palestine, sometime around 230,34 
where he settled in Caesarea.  While there, he was asked to preach in the local church, with 
approval by the clergy, specifically the Bishops Alexander and Theoctistus, who defended this 
decision to Bishop Demetrius.35  Eventually, however, Bishop Demetrius requested Origen’s 
return, and, with deacons urging him to go, Origen found himself back in Alexandria and 
resuming his work.36  This sojourn would not last long, however, and Origen may have been 
forced to leave due to his conflicted relationship with Demetrius.  Deciding to set out for Greece, 
perhaps with the intent to settle there long term, Origen was ordained during his visit to Caesarea 
on the way. Yet he stayed for only a short while in Greece before returning to and finally settling 
down in Caesarea, where he would live for the rest of his days.  This may have been due to 
difficulties that likewise had been raised, perhaps not without Bishop Demetrius’ influence, in 
Athens in regard to Origen’s orthodoxy.  Furthermore, a return to Palestine was logical for 
 
30 Eusebius, The Church History 6.8 (Maier, 213). 
31 Eusebius, The Church History 6.8.  That Eusebius believed Bishop Demetrius to be jealous of Origen’s reputation 
is evident. 
32 McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 8, 10. 
33 Eusebius, The Church History 6.19.  
34 Heine, “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 15. 
35 Eusebius, The Church History 6.19.  
36 Ibid., 6.19.  
10 
 
Origen given his acceptance there by the local clergy.37  Once there, Origen began again to 









The above biographical vignette serves as basic introduction to Origen the teacher and 
preacher.  Yet an authentic account of Origen’s contributions to the Church cannot be completed 
without reference to the centrality of the scriptures in his career and personal spirituality.  This 
section will delve into Origen as the scriptural exegete; that is, how he believed scriptural 
interpretation should be undertaken and the central themes he extrapolated from scripture.  We 
know of the importance of scripture for Origen and which scriptures he was familiar with based 
on his own statements.  Origen believed in the divine nature of the scriptures and generally 
recognized a certain division between what would later be canonized as the Old and New 
Testament.  He also highly valued the relationship between the two, with the former serving as 
 
37 Heine, “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, 15-17. 
38 Ibid., 15. 
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the prophetic vehicle for the revelation of the person of Jesus Christ in the latter.  For Origen, 
this revealing is, in fact, central to the scriptures, yet the details of which are hidden unless 
unlocked by Jesus himself.39  
 One of the hallmarks of Origen’s methodology for scriptural interpretation was his 
reading of the different “levels” of scripture: essentially, the “bodily,” the “soulish” and the 
“spiritual.”  Origen himself explains this method of interpretation in his On First Principles: 
One must therefore pourtray the meaning of the sacred writings in a threefold way upon one’s own 
soul, so that the simple man may be edified by what we may call the flesh of the scripture, this 
name being given to the obvious interpretation; while the man who has made some progress may 
be edified by its soul, as it were; and the man who is perfect and like those mentioned by the 
apostle: ‘We speak wisdom among the perfect; yet a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of 
this world, which are coming to nought; but we speak God’s wisdom in a mystery, even the 
wisdom that hath been hidden, which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory’40 – this 
man may be edified by the spiritual law, which has ‘a shadow of the good things to come’.41 For 
just as man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in the same way does the scripture, which has been 
prepared by God to be given for man’s salvation.42 
Origen therefore sees the scriptures in a tripartite manner, consistent with man’s makeup as body, 
soul and spirit. The level of the “body” presumably dealt with basic moral instruction and literal 
meanings such as those of historical narratives.  “Spiritual” meanings were mystical meanings, 
intuited by the “advanced” Christian while contemplatively delving into the meaning of God’s 
word.  In a similar manner the spiritual level also dealt with the allegorical interpretation of 
 
39 Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 132. 
40 1 Cor 2:6-7. 
41 Heb 10:1. 
42 Origen, On First Principles IV.II.5.  The translation used is that by G.W. Butterworth, Origen: On First 
Principles, trans., G.W. Butterworth, (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 277-278. 
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scripture.  The “soul” level seems to have been somewhere in the middle.  The following 
statement from Heine provides a good summary of this methodology: 
Origen believed that the bodily or literal level of Scripture could be of benefit to simple folks, who 
were not advanced in the spiritual life.  At the second, or psychic, level, Scripture delivered 
lessons to those who were moving toward perfection. Finally, at the spiritual level, Scripture deals 
with the mysteries of the Christian faith, such as the nature of the Son, his incarnation, the true 
nature of the world, and our place in it. Observers find it difficult to grasp what Origen meant by 
the psychic level.  Some scholars suggest that this level had more to do with extracting “moral” 
meaning from the text, but there appears to be little support for such a view in Origen’s extant 
writings.  One way to understand this level may be to see it as somewhere between the literal 
meaning and allegorical meanings that deal specifically with the mysteries of the faith.43 
For Origen, the scriptures take a central role in his theological methodology.  One of the 
features that gives them this prominence is their fathomless capacity to offer new Spirit-led 
insights into the divine wisdom. To paraphrase Heine, Origen sees the scriptures as offering a 
“depth of mystery,” which the human being can never fully penetrate.  As a person advances in 
their comprehension of scripture, they will nevertheless see an infinite path of progress stretching 
out ahead of them.44  Going further, Origen sees the scriptures as being purposefully “veiled,” —
divine knowledge and mysteries hidden behind a surface level understanding of the text — a 
view already implicit in Alexandrian Christianity before Origen’s time.45  This understanding 
contributes to Origen’s sense of the hidden, spiritual meaning of scripture, which must be drawn 
out by those with the capacity to do so. 
 
43 John J. O’Keefe, “Scriptural Interpretation,” The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed., John Anthony McGuckin, 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 194. 
44 Heine, Scholarship, 136. 
45 Ibid., 133. 
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 From Origen’s point of view, this capacity is not just bestowed through mere intellectual 
ability but rather comes predominantly through Christ, who is the gateway for Scriptural 
interpretation.46  Furthermore, as the Holy Spirit is the author of all Scripture, any part of 
Scripture has the possibility of a connection with the larger whole, with some parts being more 
readily applicable to others, even if they do not directly reference one another.47 Examples of 
how Origen saw this to be an authentic mode of reading Scripture are seen throughout his 
writings and homilies; for example, when discussing Genesis 1:27 and the depiction of man as 
made in God’s image, Origen relates the idea not only to Paul’s “inner man,” but also to parts of 
the Johannine Gospel which do not bear direct witness to the verse: 
All therefore, who come to him and desire to become participants in the spiritual image by their 
progress “are renewed daily in the inner man” according to the image of him who made them, so 
that they can be made “similar to the body of his glory,” but each one in proportion to his own 
powers.  The apostles transformed themselves to such an extent to his likeness that he could say of 
them, “I go to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.”  For he had already 
petitioned the Father for his disciples that the original likeness might be restored in them when he 
says, “Father,” grant “that just as you and I are one so also they may be one in us.”48 
It can be noted here that Origen’s ability to sift through and fuse together different 
readings of Scripture, such that they create a sum which is larger than its parts, may seem to be 
pushing the limits of biblical interpretation.  This is particularly the case when compared to 
contemporary standards which emphasize historical-critical methods. Where Origen locks onto a 
certain theme, deification not the least of these, he is quickly able to provide support for his 
 
46 Ibid., 134. 
47 Ibid., 135-136. 
48 Origen, Homilies on Genesis I.13.  The translation used is that by Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Homilies on Genesis 
and Exodus, trans., Ronald E. Heine, The Fathers of the Church 71, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2002) 66.  See also John 17:21-22, as noted by Heine in the same. 
14 
 
interpretations through “supporting” passages from almost anywhere else in the Scriptures.  This 
process works synergistically with his allegorizing method in that by “spiritualizing” certain 
verses or Biblical ideas, those verses can more easily be brought to bear on other verses and 
ideas which may have been spiritualized themselves.  Yet, even if Origen’s methodology was not 
completely in line with contemporary standards, as was of course the case for all early church 
theologians, it is remarkable because of the way he employed exegesis as a way of showing the 
scriptures as more than the sum of their parts, as the saying goes, and as a way of elaborating on 
what he saw as Christian truths hidden within the scriptures. Origen works interpretive wonders, 
such as when he allegorizes God’s creation of the sun and moon in the firmament in Genesis as a 
prefiguring of God’s creation of “Christ and the Church in us.”  Origen says that God’s creation 
of the stars actually refers to the patriarchs and gives an explanation as to their role in regards to 
the Church and its members. 
Just as the sun and moon are said to be the great lights in the firmament of heaven, so also are 
Christ and the Church in us.  But since God also placed stars in the firmament, let us see what are 
also stars in us, that is, in the heaven of our heart. 
Moses is a star in us, which shines and enlightens us by his acts. And Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, 
Isaias, Jermeias, Ezechiel, David, Daniel, and all to whom the Holy Spirit testify that they pleased 
God. For just as “star differs from star in glory,” so also each of the saints, according to his own 
greatness, sheds his light upon us.49 
Passages like these highlight Origen’s remarkable familiarity with Scripture.  And 
although he was not employing the standards used for biblical scholarship that are used today, it 
can be noted that Origen was quite a critical Biblical exegete for his time.  As exemplified by his 
work on the Hexapla, Origen devoted much time to attempting to discover the differences 
 
49 Ibid., I.7 (Heine, 55).  See also 1 Cor 15:41, as noted by Heine in the same. 
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between the text and their effects on the meaning derived from them.50  Yet, his writings also 
portray an exegetical methodology where the scripture is interpreted as more than the sum of its 
parts.  Origen often seeks to find fulfillment of the New Testament in types represented in the 
Old Testament.  In places where scripture conflicts or does not seem to establish any reasonable 
moral teaching, he often will turn to allegorization as a way of discerning the hidden, spiritual 
meaning of scripture.  These considerations will therefore be taken into account and further 









Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; 
and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to 
become righteous and holy and wise.51 
 At least at one time or another, for both Christians and Platonists, deification has been a 
proper understanding of the human being’s purpose in life.  Establishing his stance on the 
 
50 O’Keefe, “Scriptural Interpretation,” 193-194. 
51 Plato, Theaetetus 176A-B.  The translation used is that by Harold North Fowler, Plato: Theaetetus, Sophist, trans., 




Theaetetus in the first century BCE , the Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria, “established ‘likeness 
to God’ as the telos of human life for all the Platonists who came after him.”52  Eudorus, of 
course, was merely elevating a certain theme already inherent in Plato’s dialogues, that of 
homoiosis theoi, or likeness to the divine. 53   Besides the above-mentioned verse in the 
Theaetetus (176A-B), additional passages dealing with homoiosis include Phaedrus 245C-249A; 
Phaedo 64A-67E, 81A-84B; Republic 500C-501B, 611D-E, 612A-613E; Philebus 28C-30E; 
Symposium 207E-209E; Timaeus 41D-47C, 90A-D; and Laws 716C-D.54   
Demonstrating Middle-Platonism’s awareness of the homoiosis tenet as part of the 
Platonic philosophical tradition, Christoph Jedan draws on the following passage from Arius 
Didymus from around the end of the first century BCE: 
 
Socrates, Plato, just as Pythagoras [thought that] the goal (of life) was likeness to 
god (ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ). Plato described it more clearly by adding 'as far as possible' 
(προσθεὶς 'τὀ κατἀ τὀ δυνατὁν'), but it is only possible through understanding and 
that is living according to virtue (τοῦτο δ' ἧν τὀ κατ' ἀρετἠν <ζῆν>) [As to what it is 
that should become as like as possible] with respect to god, it is the making and 
administration of the cosmos and with respect to the sage, it is the arrangement 
and conduct of his life. This is just what Homer hinted at, when he wrote 'he followed 
on the god's track' (κατ' ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο). It was after him that Pythagoras 
said 'follow god' (Ἕπου θεῷ). It is clear that [with this he meant] not a visibly preceding 





52 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 141. 
53 Christoph Jedan, “Metaphors of Closeness:Reflections on Homoiôsis Theôi in Ancient Philosophy and Beyond,” 
Numen, vol. 60 (2013), 59-60. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeus 2.49.8-18 (ed. Wachsmuth 1884), as quoted in Jedan, “Metaphors of 
Closeness:Reflections on Homoiôsis Theôi in Ancient Philosophy and Beyond,” 56.  
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What caused the Platonists to home in on divine likeness as a central thesis of Plato’s 
philosophy?  This question could require a whole thesis in its own right, and thus is not fully 
addressed here.  Yet in order to understand how this theme was further developed by Middle 
Platonists and later, Philo and Plotinus, a brief consideration of the importance of divine likeness 
in Plato’s own thought will be given.  This purpose of all this is to serve as a helpful basis of 
comparison for discussing Origen’s theology of deification and to demonstrate Origen’s 
inheritance of the philosophical concepts and terminology of Plato, which had by that point been 
developed by Middle Platonists. 
To begin with, in order that one know what is the proper telos in regards to the human 
life, one would need to know who or what exactly is man, and who or what exactly is the divine, 
such that there can even be a relation drawn between the two in the first place. To answer this, 
one can begin with a look at Plato’s words in the Phaedrus: 
Every soul is immortal.  For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves 
something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live.  Only that 
which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source 
and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion.  But the beginning is ungenerated.  
For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not 
generated from anything; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be 
generated from a beginning.  And since it is ungenerated, it must also be indestructible; for if the 
beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, 
since all things must be generated from a beginning.  Thus that which moves of itself must be the 
beginning of motion.  And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens 
and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin.  
But since that which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says that this self-
motion is the essence and the very idea of the soul, will not be disgraced.  For every body which 
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derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, 
since that is the nature of the soul; but if this is true,—that that which moves itself is nothing else 
than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal.56 
 Plato identifies above that the soul is immortal and without a beginning, that is to 
say, ungenerated.  For Plato, then, the soul is indestructible.  This is also why, for Plato, 
the soul “remembers” abstract qualities that exist in their perfection in the time in which 
the soul exists, but is not in a body.57  Below is the continuation of the above Phaedrus 
passage which further illustrates Plato’s understanding of this state, how it is attained to 
and lost, as well as a metaphorical example of the role played by the composition of the 
soul in this process: 
Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the 
following manner.  To tell what it really is would be a matter or utterly superhuman and long 
discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in 
that way.  We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a 
charioteer.  Now the horses and charioteers of gods are all good and of good descent, but those of 
other races are mixed; and first the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of 
the horses is noble and of noble breed and character, but the other quite opposite in breed and 
character.  Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome.  Now we 
must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal.  Soul, considered collectively, has 
the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in 
one form and sometimes in another; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward 
and governs the whole world; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold 
of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be 
 
56 Plato, Phaedrus 245C-246A.  The translation used is that by Harold North Fowler, Plato I: Euthyprho, Apology, 
Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans., H.N. Fowler, (Great Britain: William Heinemann Ltd, [1914] 1982), 468-471. 
57 Plato, Phaedo 75C-76A.  The translation used is that by Harold North Fowler, Plato I: Euthyprho, Apology, Crito, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans., H.N. Fowler, (Great Britain: William Heinemann Ltd, [1914] 1982), 262-265. 
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self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and 
body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal.  It is not immortal by reasonable 
supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal 
being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time.  Let that, however, and our 
words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses 
its wings.  It is something like this. 
The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place 
where dwells the race of the gods.  More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes 
of the nature of the divine.  But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities; by 
these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as 
vileness and evil, they are wasted away and destroyed.58 
As indicated in the passage above, for Plato, the human soul consists of the components 
of a charioteer, and a noble and ignoble steed.  Plato further elaborates on these components by 
positing that the wings of the soul allow it to soar upwards to where the gods dwell; meanwhile 
the wings of the soul are nourished by the “beauty, wisdom, goodness and all such qualities” of 
the divine.  In this otherworldly depiction, Plato demonstrates that the human soul which has 
“lost its wings” will be born in a physical body.  This soul that “lost its wings,” presumably 
means here the soul that allows the mortal or “evil steed,” to lead; and therefore allows the allure 
of sensual things to dominate and thus drag down the soul to an earthly abode.59   
 
58Plato, Phaedrus 246A-E (Fowler, 470-475). 
59 See, e.g., Harold North Fowler, in “Introduction To The Phaedrus,” in Plato I: Euthyprho, Apology, Crito, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans., H.N. Fowler, (Great Britain: William Heinemann Ltd, [1914] 1982), 409: “The two 
horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the 
body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer is 
reason.  It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are 
involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato’s conception of the soul.”  Incorporating later 
Platonists’ expositions, James Duerlinger, provides his own understanding of the role of the horses which seems to 
advance upon Fowler’s notions: “The gods are claimed (Timaeus 41a-47d, 89d-90d) to have combined this [mortal] 
soul, along with the body they created, with the immortal soul they received from God, so that the whole could 
receive sustenance and protection and the immortal soul might be able to release itself from embodiment.  The other 
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Indeed, according to Platonic philosophy, the philosopher’s goal while on earth is to 
separate the things of the soul, so much as is possible, from the things of the body. Plato has 
Socrates saying as much in the Phaedo, in which Socrates discusses the soul and its afterlife: 
And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, 
in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of 
collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both 
now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?60 
Socrates maintains that in keeping ourselves pure from the contaminating influences of the body, we can 
go on after our deaths to a pure spiritual afterlife; one in which we reach communion with that which is 
truly pure.61 
Returning to our depiction of the soul as a charioteer and its horses from the Phaedrus, 
Plato goes on to show the soul’s capacity for its telos by describing it in celestial imagery. For 
the gods, who live in heaven, enjoy always the “many blessed sights and many ways hither and 
thither within the heaven,” but also, “the region above the heaven.” 62   This region is 
characterized by the “colourless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all 
true knowledge is concerned.”63  Only the “divine intelligence” can enjoy this vision which is 
further characterized by the qualities of “absolute justice, temperance and knowledge, and not 
 
powers of these immortal souls, we learn from Albinus, are actually the forms of the spirited and appetitive parts of 
the mortal soul.  It thus appears that these are powers used by the immortal soul to move, from above, the self-
sufficient bodies they possess, and that the gods created the mortal parts of the human soul in the image of these 
parts of the immortal soul.  The unruliness of one of the steeds of the immortal part of the human soul does not, 
consequently, belong to the appetitive part of the embodied human soul, but rather to its form.  Thus for the 
immortal part of the human soul to live the divine life it needs to become free of the impurity that led to its 
embodiment and to accomplish full contemplation of true being.” James Duerlinger, “Ethics and the Divine Life in 
Plato’s Philosophy,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 13, no. 2 (Fall, 1985), 316. 
60 Plato, Phaedo 67C-D (Fowler, 232-233). 
61 Ibid., 67A-B. 
62 Plato, Phaedrus 247A-C (Fowler, 474-475). 
63 Ibid., 247C-D (Fowler, 474-477). 
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such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things 
we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute.”64 
Although Plato describes this vision as properly belonging to the gods, he hints that those 
who live the life of a philosopher can, at the least, gain a glimpse of this celestial vision.  
Socrates claims as much in Phaedo, where he looks forward with hope to his death, believing 
that he will soon be in the company of the gods.65  Furthermore, Socrates indicates that for this 
reason the philosophic life is nothing other than a preparation for death.66  For a philosopher, 
according to Socrates in the Theaetetus, is not at home in this world in the same way as most 
people are, yet knows the measure of things in ways that other persons, unaccustomed to 
philosophical enquiry, can scarcely grasp.67   In order to live the life of a philosopher, two 
essentials are required: moral virtue, that is to say virtue which is cultivated in an ethical way of 
living, and contemplative knowledge or wisdom, which allows one to know of the divine by 
means of inquiring about the true nature of things.68   Together these lead to a likeness to God.   
What or who is God for Plato? Apparently it is not so clear, in that while Plato talks of 
the divine, he also often mentions “the gods” and does not seem to give any straightforward 
account of God in his dialogues. What has been received are Plato’s philosophical assumptions 
on the nature of the One or Good, as well as lines from Plato’s dialogues that qualify God.  For 
example, according to Socrates in the Theatetus, one of God’s, or “the Divine’s” attributes is his 
perfect righteousness: “God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly 
righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly 
 
64 Ibid., 247D-E (Fowler, 476-477). 
65 Plato, Phaedo 69A-E. 
66 Ibid., 64A. 
67 Plato, Theaetetus 173C – 177C. 
68 Duerlinger, “Ethics and the Divine Life in Plato’s Philosophy,” 313-314. 
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perfect in righteousness.” 69   God is also clearly immortal, and seemingly intellectual and 
unchanging, in that our souls resemble the divine through these properties that it itself 
possesses.70  A complete account of who or what Plato thought God was is unfortunately too 
much to address here.  However, we can glean something rather easily of what Plato thought of 
God in the ways he envisioned what likeness to God entailed.  As mentioned above, it is 
therefore by being “righteous and holy and wise,” through cultivated virtue and contemplated 
wisdom, that we become like God.  In a general way then, we could say that God for Plato is the 
ultimate model or source for these qualities such as wisdom, righteousnesss, and virtue.  With 
this in mind, it is not surprising that the concept of deification was most attractive not only to 
later Platonists but to the early Christians as well, who literally worshipped a God-man.  With 
this point, we can now begin to look at how deification entered into and developed within the 
Christian tradition.  
*** 
 





69 Plato, Theaetetus 176C (Fowler, 128-129). 
70 Plato, Phaedo 80A-80B , 106D. 
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As stated above, given the Revelation of Jesus Christ as God becoming incarnate, it was 
only a matter of time before the first followers of Christ were to recognize this process in 
reverse; that is, man becoming God, or rather becoming as much like God as possible.  
Furthermore, verses like those below, show that a seminal version of the idea was not lacking in 
scriptural writings: 
The Jews again picked up rocks to stone him.  Jesus answered them, “I have shown you many 
good works from my Father.  For which of these are you trying to stone me?” The Jews answered 
him, “We are not stoning you for a good work but for blasphemy.  You, a man, are making 
yourself God.”  Jesus answered them, “Is it not written in the law, ‘I said, “You are gods”’?  If it 
calls them gods to whom the word of God came, and scripture cannot be set aside, can you say 
that the one whom the Father has consecrated and sent into the world blasphemes because I said, ‘I 




 So be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect.72 
 
 In their essay entitled “The Scriptural Roots of Deification,” David Vincent Meconi, S.J. 
and Carl E. Olson recognize in the Synoptics “three key themes relating to theosis: the 
Fatherhood of God, believers described as “sons of God”, and mankind’s participation in the 
Kingdom of God (or Kingdom of heaven).”  As they go on to point out, all three of these themes 
can be found in the Sermon on the Mount passage in Matthew’s gospel.73  In this passage, Jesus 
performs the role of a new Moses, extending the Covenant to all nations, while also 
 
71 John 10:34-36, The New American Bible. 
72 Matt 5:48. 
73 David Meconi, S.J. and Carl E. Olson, “The Scriptural Roots of Deification,” Called To Be The Children Of God: 
The Catholic Theology of Human Deification, eds., David Meconi S.J. and Carl E. Olson, (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2016), 23-24. 
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acknowledging his followers as children of the Father, 74 inasmuch as they imitate God’s love 
toward others, particularly one’s enemies.75 
 Meanwhile in Luke, divine son-ship becomes explicitly associated with resurrection (Lk: 
20:35-36), while in Mark we find Jesus calling those who do the will of God, “my brother, and 
sister, and mother” (Mk 3:35).76  It is therefore clear that while these passages do not rise quite to 
the same level that the Church Fathers will take their deifying language, they nevertheless make 
apparent an affinity between God and man that is primarily characterized by a filial dimension, 
and secondarily by a familial dimension.  This language is important in that it speaks of an 
underlying unity between God and man in which man has a capacity to act as God acts, and thus 
to share, at least in some respects, the attributes of God.  This alludes to man’s sharing of 
additional unearthly attributes such as immortality in the heavenly life, for example as alluded to 
above in Luke.  As will be explored later on, the Church Fathers, Origen not the least of which, 
would develop stronger language to describe the deifying effects of man’s affinity with God 
through the Son’s incarnation, which would additionally be characterized by unitive and marital 
dimensions.  For now, however, in returning to the filial dimension we discover that it becomes 
all the more prominent in John’s Gospel. 
 Indeed, in John’s Gospel, it is by partaking of this filial relationship which is made 
readily available by the Son through grace, in which human beings are spiritually reborn, that 
they become adopted sons and daughters of God.  The adopted son-ship of human beings, who 
are separate from their Creator, does not allow one to claim for him or herself Christ’s unique 
role of Son — to do so would be in error due to the nature of the relationship between man and 
 
74 Ibid., 24. 
75 Ibid., 23-24. 
76 Ibid., 25-26. 
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God, in which man receives the grace from God to become as he is but not essentially so.77  John 
makes it clear in the prologue to his gospel that the “Word was God,” that through him “all 
things came to be,” that he grants the “power to become children of God,” and from “his fullness 
we have all received.”  Furthermore the Son is the Father’s “only son,” and is able to fully reveal 
God to the world through the grace and truth that come through him.78 
 The theme of deification present in John was in no way lost upon Origen. Clearly 
exposing this theme for the purposes of his commentary, Origen makes clear efforts to extract a 
satisfactory explanation of man’s divine telos in relation to the incarnation of the Word.  As such, 
this thesis will rely on Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel According to John, the history of the 
writing of which has already been briefly touched upon, as a central text in this study.  For now, 
it is left to us to continue to another sacred Scripture writer who would appear to have a 
prominent effect on Origen’s thinking, including his theology of deification: St. Paul of Tarsus.  
Due to the importance of Paul’s writings on the formation of the Christian understanding of the 
soul and his own unique language concerning the divinization of the Christian, the next chapter 
will deal in somewhat more depth with what Paul had to say on these topics.  This will better 
prepare us to understand Origen’s own perspectives on the same, given that Origen strove to 
maintain theological consistency with Paul, who, as will later be shown, he is often relying upon 
for his concept of the human soul while still attempting to utilize Platonic ideas. 
 
 
77 Ibid., 27, 28. 





II. Origen and the Human Person: Origen’s Theological Anthropology as 








Gnostic, dualistic, Platonist; these traditional adjectives, and others suggestive of 
heterodoxy, were scholarly terms of choice to apply to Origen’s theological anthropology, one 
which had been dismantled of any remaining Christian legitimacy by the Fifth Ecumenical 
Council in 553.  Nor was this assessment entirely incorrect in certain of these affirmations. 
Rather, it seems, the rock that was Origen’s more ecclesiastic and Christological side was left 
unturned in favor of a status quo treatment which emphasized the speculative and philosophical, 
yet ultimately non-contributive, nature of an other-worldly quasi-theology.  This thinking was to 
be disrupted, however, with the dawn of the ressourcement or nouvelle théologie scholarship, 
which contributed to the rehabilitation of Origen as a thoroughly ecclesiastic theologian mystic, 
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albeit one who, like other early Christian thinkers, did not eschew from drawing from his 
philosophical background in explicating spiritual truths.1  
Contemporary theologians and scholars have come to benefit from these developments in 
Origenian scholarship by gaining new insight into Origen the Churchman.  For example, 
Benjamin P. Blosser begins his work “Become Like the Angels: Origen’s Doctrine on the Soul,” 
by identifying the importance of these developments in Origenian scholarship.  The thesis of this 
work is that Origen’s entire systematic theology rests centrally upon his theological 
anthropology; and it is only by understanding Origen as biblical exegete and Christological 
thinker that this influential Christian theological anthropology starts coming through to us.2  
Blosser still recognizes Origen’s indebtedness to Middle Platonism, however, and thus his thesis 
involves the comparison of Origen’s doctrine of the soul to corresponding Middle Platonic 
positions.3 
This section will likewise cover Origen’s doctrine of the soul in acknowledgement of the 
importance of this doctrine to Origen’s overall theology.  Therefore, like Blosser, the section will 
deal with Origen’s theological anthropology by comparing it to Middle Platonic concepts of the 
soul.  This will include views of division of the soul, as well as the relationship of the soul to 
body, mind and spirit. A point to note here is that Origen’s theological anthropology relates 
heavily to his usage of the terms “image” and “likeness” in their theological context.  These 
 
1 See also, e.g., Blosser, Become Like the Angels, 1-13. 
2 Ibid., “In addition, many contemporary treatments of Origen’s anthropology have shown that his teaching ought 
not to be viewed primarily in light of the static conceptual models of the philosophical schools, but rather in light of 
the moral, mystical, and biblical concept of man’s creation in the divine image, along with his vocation to return to 
God.  Past scholars were often too preoccupied, even obsessed, with controversies over Origen’s doctrine of 
preexistence of souls that they were prevented from developing an appreciation for Origen’s anthropology as a 
whole.  It has emerged repeatedly that Origen’s anthropology is not as imbued with dualism as was previously 
suspected.  Origen’s anthropology is far more informed by biblical motifs, and Christology in particular, than by 
Platonic philosophical assumptions.” 10. 
3 Ibid., 12. 
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terms will not be a major focus of the below discussion however, since they are dealt with more 
in the following section. 
To begin, it is important to outline the philosophical background in regards to the nature 
of the soul that Origen would have been exposed to in his time.  As Blosser points out, the 
Middle Platonists did not have a straightforward account of the soul, nor were their views 
entirely “Platonist,” in the sense that they seemed not to represent Plato’s original thoughts on 
the matter.  By contrast, the Middle Platonists had adopted both Peripatetic and Stoic 
philosophies, as a way to explain the soul’s bipartition or unicity, respectively.  Tripartism, 
which Plato espoused in his Republic, was designated by a soul divided into a higher logistikon 
(the rational part), and the lower epithumetikon (the irrational part) and thumoeides (the spirited 
part).  While Middle Platonists such as Alcinous and Antiochus of Ascalon, claimed themselves 
as adherents to the tripartist model, Peripatetic influences could be seen among the Middle 
Platonists, as well.  The latter, for example, seemed to illustrate that Plato meant his tripartism in 
a mythological sense, and thus really taught a bipartite model in which there was a 
straightforward divide between the rational and sensible.4 
Jewish biblical exegete and platonizing philosopher Philo, born sometime between 20 
and 15 BC,5 for his part, saw a bipartite division of the rational (logikon) and the irrational 
(alogon).6  Whereas the logikon was associated with the intellect (nous), the alogon was to be 
identified with the physical senses.7  Although not having a discernible influence on Middle 
Platonism itself, Philo did have a considerable one on Origen (as well as Clement for that matter). 
 
4 Ibid., 18-24.  Blosser cites Dillon in his conclusion concerning Antiochus’ bipartite view of the soul;  Dillon 
however, rather seems to recognize a Stoic view of the soul in Antiochus, although he admits of there also being 
bipartite elements – this in addition to there still being a form of a tripartite view.  See also John Dillon, The Middle 
Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 102, 174. 
5 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 140. 




Dillon, in fact, claims that as regarded Platonism, Origen was more dependent on Philo than any 
recent source of his time.  Indeed, comparing the following passages from Philo and Origen, 
respectively, one can easily draw the conclusion that Origen took cues from Philo’s own 
platonizing exegesis: 
He shows here that there is a vast difference between the Man being fashioned now and the one 
that was created before ‘in the image of God’.  The one moulded now is perceptible by the senses, 
participates in quality, is a compound of body and soul, either male or female, by nature mortal.  
The one created ‘in the image’ is a sort of Idea or genus or seal (sphragis), intelligible, immaterial, 
neither male nor female, by nature imperishable.8 
 
This quote from Philo shows that the rational, immaterial soul is starkly contrasted with 
the sensible physical component of man, both of which are created by God, but which are 
described separately in the two Genesis creation accounts.  Origen, likewise, indicates something 
very similar in one of his homilies on Genesis, in which he, like Philo, designates between the 
forming or fashioning of the physical man versus the making or creating of the spiritual man, “in 
the image of God.” 
We do not understand, however, this man indeed whom Scripture says was made “according to the 
image of God” to be corporeal.  For the form of the body does not contain the image of God, nor is 
the corporeal man said to be “made,” but “formed,” as is written in the words which follow.  For 
the text says: “And God formed man,” that is fashioned, “from the slime of the earth.”9 
 
 Yet despite his apparent bipartism, Philo also expresses tripartite and Stoic sensibilities in 
regard to his psychology.  Ultimately, however, these categories fall away, in that the 
epithumetikon and thumoeides elements become yoked in opposition to the logistikon.  Philo can 
 
8 Philo, Opif. 134, as quoted in Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 176. 
9 Origen, Homilies on Genesis I.13 (Heine, 63). 
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even go so far as to say that there are in fact two souls in the human being, the rational and the 
irrational.10  Although a thorough comparison of Philo and Origen’s psychologies cannot be 
attempted here, it is notable that Philo mostly agreed with a bipartite view of the soul. As he was 
not only a fellow biblical exegete, but also a philosophical speculator immersed in the Middle 
Platonic tradition, it does not seem a stretch to say that Origen would have found somewhat of an 
affinity with his Alexandrian predecessor in regards to soul partition.  Therefore what we find in 
Origen is already somewhat familiar to that which concerns us in Philo – a mostly bipartite 
concept of the soul that echoes the Middle Platonic tradition yet which has been sieved through 
the moral authority of the scriptures. 
 To show Origen’s familiarity with Middle Platonist positions of his day, we can turn to 
Origen’s most philosophical work, On First Principles, where his philosophical views on the 
soul are laid out for us in a reasonably straightforward manner.  In On First Principles 3.4.1 -
3.4.4, Origen responds to three Middle Platonic designations of the soul: firstly, the idea that the 
soul is tripartite (in the original Platonic sense), secondly that there are two souls in man, and 
thirdly the idea that there is one soul but that it is divided between the spirit and the flesh.  This 
last position, however, is depicted by Origen in a more Gnostic sense, and thus can be contrasted 
with Origen’s actual position on the matter.11 
 To begin with, Origen starts out by dismissing tripartism of the soul, citing the lack of 
any confirmation of tripartism by divine scripture.  In this case, it seems obvious that Origen is 
rejecting an ontological take of Plato’s Republic IV. 436A-441C, since he mentions this view as 
belonging to “some Greeks” and characterizes it as dividing the soul into a rational and irrational 
part, with the irrational part further divided into “the two emotional elements of appetite and 
 
10 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 174-176.  See also Blosser, Become Like the Angels, 25. 
11 See also Blosser, Become Like the Angels, 26-37. 
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passion.”12  Origen has little else to say on the matter and, having swiftly dealt with this position, 
continues on to deal with the position that there are two souls in man. 
 In describing this position, Origen indicates that those who align themselves with it 
believe that there is a higher soul and a lower soul.  The higher soul is that which is “good and 
heavenly” while the other soul is “lower and earthly.”  In regards to the latter, it is maintained 
that those who hold this view believe that it cannot survive except in relation to the body.  
Origen does not mention explicitly who it is whose views he is describing here, however there 
are indications that he is no longer describing those of Middle Platonist philosophers, but rather 
other Christians.  He mentions how the persons who believe in this theory use scripture passages 
to justify their view.  The verses that Origen records which are used to support this theory are 
notably mostly Pauline; in fact, out of ten verses he mentions in support of this theory, eight are 
cited from Paul, and most of which are from Galatians or Romans.  Most of these verses have to 
do with a fundamental opposition between the nature of the spirit and that of the flesh, such as 
the verse, “the flesh warreth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, so that we may not 
do the things that we will to do.”13 
For his opponents, the bodily soul is the cause of moral evils, originating in the soul 
feelings that are diametrically opposed to the motivations of the higher soul which is 
distinguished by its capacity and affinity for spiritual things.  Continuing on, the reader reaches a 
point where it is difficult at first to tell if Origen is actually agreeing with this view or rejecting it.  
This is rather due to, in typical Origenian fashion, Origen engaging with the theory in such a way 
in which he projects his own speculations onto it, thus modifying it in the process and recreating 
it in his own image.  The switch occurs when Origen points out that we can say that the flesh and 
 
12 Origen, On First Principles III.IV.1 (Butterworth, 230).  See also the footnote on the same page citing the 
indicated passage in Plato’s Republic. 
13 Ibid., III.IV.2 (Butterworth, 232).  The verse is noted as a reference to Gal 5:17 in the same. 
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the spirit can be said to have their own wills – this would seem to indicate that, in order to each 
have a will, both the flesh and the spirit would each have their own soul.  However, Origen never 
affirms that, but rather seems to posit that the “wills” of the flesh and the spirit are not wills in 
the true sense of the word.  Furthermore, later on in the chapter when Origen has begun 
discussing the third position, mentioned above, on the soul, he points out that the flesh does not 
really have a “soul or wisdom of its own,” but that just as one can use figurative language such 
as in the phrase, “the ground is thirsty,” so also is this type of language used in scriptural phrases 
such as “wisdom of the flesh,” and “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” which could otherwise 
imply an autonomous understanding of the flesh or spirit.  
In furthering this point, Origen reveals his own hand in the matter by establishing that 
“the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly 
serving and obeying one of the two, whichever it has chosen to obey.”14  He explains that this 
will of the soul is “above and beyond,” the wills which are said to belong to the spirit and to the 
flesh.  Thus, it appears he maintains these wills but only in a metaphorical sense, in that they 
depict a certain moral orientation that the soul is liable to be drawn to one way or the other and 
which it is free to choose between.  By turning towards one or the other in its moral decisions, 
the soul takes on the qualities and unites itself with the respective component.  Thus, the soul 
may be said to either become “fleshly” or “spiritual.” 
 This assessment by Origen reveals to us a noticeably bipartite theorization of the soul, yet 
one in which the unity of the soul is preserved by the recognition that the bipartite element of the 
soul is the morally diametric position it finds itself in.  That is to say, the soul has the bipartite 
option of choosing either the fleshly or the spiritual, based on its moral choices, yet will retain a 
unity while progressing in either one or the other direction. Blosser explains Origen’s account as 
 
14 Origen, On First Principles III.IV.2 (Butterworth, 233). 
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that of “a simple soul with two possible lifestyles open to it, or even of dual external powers 
drawing it in two directions,” and that, “the language of partition is only one of many images 
utilized by Origen to describe the complex nature of the soul – it is doubtful that Origen intended 
it to be taken literally.”15 As Blosser also relates, Origen typically describes the soul from a 
moral vantage point, and when he does appear to be talking about the soul from an ontological 
perspective, as with the passage from On First Principles, above, these two vantages points seem 
to merge.16  This can likewise be attributed to Origen’s belief in the unity of the soul, but a soul 
which is conditioned or augmented by its moral choices. 
Additionally, Origen couches his language in the context of spiritual combat, in which 
the flesh and spirit are at odds with one another.  He employs terms such as “inner man” man and 
“outer man,” which do not depict two literal men or souls within the human person, but rather 
depict a specific moral orientation or status.  The biblical terms “inner man” and “outer man” are 
important for our overall discussion and therefore are dealt with in more detail later.  For our 
current purposes, however, it is beneficial to note that the orientation or status depicted by said 
terms is not only ushered in by the incarnation of the Logos, without which such an orientation 
would not be available to mankind, but also by the choice of the individual.  Thus the soul is one, 
but it has the binary option of modifying its ontological reality based on its moral decisions.  As 
Blosser describes it, Origen, “seems to defend the theory of a unified soul, using Stoic 
terminology, which seems incompatible with any model of soul division at all.  And yet he does 
use language pointing to some sort of duality or tension within the soul, hinting at bipartition but 
avoiding the strict language of bipartition theory.”17  This puts Origen in a separate position than 
 
15 Blosser, Become Like the Angels, 35. 
16 Ibid., 34-37. 
17 Ibid., 35. 
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that of his Middle Platonic companions, who either upheld a truly metaphysical bipartite option 
or that of a heavily Stoicized view of a soul devoid of any partition whatsoever. 18 
What could be said by Origen of the third option, presumably that of the Gnostics, which 
argues that the flesh pulls men down from spiritual things such that they are drawn away from 
God?  Again, Origen seems to follow and agree with this reasoning up to a certain point.  For 
example, as alluded to in our discussion above, he points out the verse “The wisdom of the flesh 
is enmity against God,” interpreting it, in agreement with the position he is describing, as 
referring to how it is a metaphor for how the body’s demands are in conflict with divine and 
spiritual things.  Yet further on in the passage, Origen shows, in the same manner as with the 
second position, where he departs with this view.  As Origen frames the argument, his opponents 
make the claim that because the mind of the flesh is at enmity with God it is therefore evil.  
Origen asserts that this kind of reasoning is “certainly satisfactory to none but the heretics, who 
because they cannot defend the justice of God by pious reasoning compose impious 
inventions.”19  Origen’s point is that God cannot create something that is truly at enmity with 
himself since it would be an instance of God making something both evil and not subject to him, 
which would, “certainly appear absurd.”20  He goes on to highlight that even if somehow God 
were to create a soul in such a way, that it was an evil soul at enmity with God, then this would 
result in the position that souls are diverse in their natures, with some created for salvation and 
some for damnation.  This is a position which Origen clearly rejects, as he states immediately 
after.21  In his assessment, Origen is therefore both defending the goodness of creation, 
specifically the body, as well as free will.   
 
18 Ibid., 34-36. 
19 Origen, On First Principles III.IV.4 (Butterworth, 236). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., III.IV.4 (Butterworth, 235-236). 
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Interestingly, even after having revealed his own personal thoughts on the three positions 
in question, Origen ends the discussion by offering the reader the choice of which position is 
correct.  Yet, through his corrections of a two souls theory and a theory of a singular soul which 
necessitates a fleshly component which is devoid of a “good” nature, Origen shows enough of 
his own position on the matter.  Essentially, Origen shows that he agrees with a singular soul, 
one which is indeed drawn away from spiritual matters due to the earthly temptations of the body, 
but which was nevertheless created good in all of its aspects – body and spirit, included.  
Furthermore, he shows the importance of free will by his denial that some souls are created good 
and some bad, which supports his framing the argument in a moral context.   This moral position 
allows Origen to argue for a singular soul with a soft bipartition in its ability to choose between 
the spiritual and fleshly in such a way that it is either dragged down by the flesh or lifted up by 
the spirit.  It is not that the flesh is bad, but that there is a disorder when it is chosen over and 
against the spirit. 
Nevertheless, Origen is clear that it is not the body which possesses the “image of God,” 
but the soul, and that the body is in fact inferior to the soul, diminishing the capacities that the 
mind and spirit are able to perform.  Taking his cue from Paul, Origen uses the term “flesh” 
(sarx) to describe the body in its limitations, as opposed to the goodness of body which is 
conferred on it by God. 22  Although Origen differs from the Platonists on his account of the soul, 
can we still say his ambivalence toward the body here contains Platonic influences?   
It is worth noting here again that for Origen, all points must agree with scripture for a 
theological theory to be considered sound.  If this was not the case, he would not have abruptly 
rejected Platonic tripartism at the beginning of his discussion of soul partition in On First 
Principles on the basis that he did not observe this position to be “strongly confirmed by the 
 
22 Blosser, Become Like the Angels, 47-48. 
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authority of divine scripture.”23  Still there are some similarities with Platonic positions on the 
body.  Mostly this has to do with Origen’s and Platonic positions emphasis on mistaking the 
material for that which is of the highest good, the divine.  By centering one’s efforts on chasing 
mundane desires, one substitutes what should be their true telos, which is the divine, for a façade.  
Just as in Plato’s allegory of the cave, Origen also recognizes that earthly things are inferior 
when held up to the light of things divine.   
In this manner, however, he shares just as much if not more with Paul, one of his favorite 
sources when it comes to matters of the soul and body, as he does with Plato. If Origen found a 
useful idea or two about a conflict between the flesh and the spirit in Plato, it is in Paul that he 









 To begin to assess the impact of Paul on Origen’s doctrine of deification, one first has to 
answer a deceptively simple-sounding question: Does Paul uphold, in the final analysis, a 
 
23 Origen, On First Principles, III.IV.1 (Butterworth, 231).  See also On First Principles IV.I.1 (Butterworth, 256) 
where Origen states that, “Now in our investigation of these important matters we do not rest satisfied with the 
common opinions and the evidence of things that are seen, but we use in addition, for the manifest proof of our 
statements, testimonies drawn from the scriptures which we believe to be divine, both from what is called the Old 
Testament and also from the New, endeavouring to confirm our faith by reason.” 
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doctrine of deification?  This question is specifically addressed by Stephen Finlan in his essay 
entitled “Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul,” and his answer, he maintains, is dependent on what 
is meant by the term theosis.  The author is agreed with Finlan on this point, although Finlan 
limits himself to a central point of his essay that it is Paul’s theology of the spiritual body that 
allows us to confirm a form of theosis in Paul.24  Although it will be argued further below that 
divinization in Paul can be discerned beyond his descriptions of the spiritual body, this theme is 
nevertheless an excellent place to start with, for the following reasons: firstly, deification 
necessarily entails transformation of the deified subject, the components of which (body, soul, or 
mind, if we are to speak of the theological anthropological components typically identified with 
the human person) are agents through which these transformations occur and manifest 
themselves.  Secondarily, the state of the spiritual body is an idyllic and celestial state of 
existence and thus, when discussing the possibility of deification of the human person, the 
spiritual body yields the most promise in being identifiable as a deified state, as such.  This 
makes identifying essential elements of Christian deification, such as immortality, a matter of 
whether such elements are identifiable in the spiritual body and to what degree, in the sense that 
they reflect the corresponding Divine attribute.  Thirdly, the spiritual body is a prominent theme 
in Paul, and has implications for his theological anthropology in general.  Understanding Paul’s 
overall theological anthropology will be of use in evaluating Origen’s similarities with Paul.  
 To begin with, let us listen to Paul’s own words on the subject: 
But someone may say, ‘How are the dead raised?  With what kind of body will they come back?’  
You fool!  What you sow is not brought to life unless it dies.  And what you sow is not the body 
that is to be but a bare kernel of wheat, perhaps, or of some other kind; but God gives it a body as 
he chooses, and to each of the seeds its own body.  Not all flesh is the same, but there is one kind 
 
24 Finlan, “Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul,” 68. 
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for human beings, another kind of flesh for animals, another kind of flesh for birds, and another 
for fish.  There are both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the brightness of the heavenly is 
one kind and that of the earthly another.  The brightness of the sun is one kind, the brightness of 
the moon another, and the brightness of the stars another. 
 
So also is the resurrection of the dead.  It is sown corruptible; it is raised incorruptible.  It is sown 
dishonorable; it is raised glorious.  It is sown weak; it is raised powerful.  It is sown a natural 
body; it is raised a spiritual body.  If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body.25 
   
 From the above passage, it is clear that the heavenly and earthly bodies are of different 
kinds of brightness; the heavenly being incorruptible, glorious, powerful and spiritual, while the 
earthly is corruptible, dishonorable, weak and natural.  The qualities of the spiritual body mimic 
the divine attributes, and thus allow the redeemed human being to take part in the Resurrection 
event (1 Cor 15:50-58).  Finlan points out that God is doing a “new thing” here; rather than 
resurrecting a physical body or transmitting the person into a disembodied ghost state, God is 
elevating the human person to an “embodied form that is not physical.”26   
 Indeed, I would agree that what Paul is trying to depict is not a transition from gross 
physicality to mere ethereality but a more complex process whereby the physical body is 
hierarchically transmutated into an elevated spiritual body, which is still a body as such.  Origen 
would seem to agree with this assessment.  Although Origen’s confirmation of the bodily 
resurrection 27  had a more orthodox grounding (particularly in respect to later doctrinal 
developments) than did his theory of pre-existence, it still came under attack from other Church 
 
25 1 Cor 15:35-44. 
26 Finlan, “Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul,” 71. 
27 This point is somewhat arguable, although I will attempt to show here why a reading of a confirmation of the 
Christian concept of bodily resurrection is indeed the case. 
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Fathers — in this case, most notably, Methodius and Epiphanius, who spurned Origen for what 
they perceived as a rejection of the bodily resurrection in his thinking.28 
For Origen, however, much of his concern in relation to this matter dealt with an attempt 
to harmonize Paul’s “spiritual body” (1 Corinthians 15:44) with a physical body in constant flux. 
The result was the insertion of philosophical nuances which Origen felt allowed for the 
maintaining of the Scriptural basis of the bodily resurrection. This “fleshed-out” theology of the 
body was therefore designed to answer the question of how a physical body, a composition of 
substances in constant flux, could keep an identity synonymous with a resurrected body, while 
still trying to show how the two are dissimilar.29  
To solve this conundrum, Origen employs the idea of the logos spermatikos, a Stoic 
philosophical principle that, as Brandon Morgan states, “governs the growth of living organisms 
and determines the development of bodies.”30  This spiritual principle, or “life principle” 
maintains the identity from physical to spiritual bodily forms.  As Morgan points out, Origen 
uses the following analogy to describe this phenomenon: 
…although the bodies die and are corrupted and scattered, nevertheless by the word of God that 
same life principle which has all along been preserved in the essence of the body raises them up 
from the earth and restores and refashions them, just as the power which exists in a grain of wheat 
refashions and restores the grain, after its corruption and death, into a body with a stalk and 
ear…the life-principle before mentioned, by which the body is refashioned, at the command of God 
 
28 Brandon Morgan, “’We Will All Be Changed’: Materiality, Resurrection and Reaping Spiritual Bodies in 
Origen’s Peri Archon,” American Theological Inquiry, vol. 7, no. 2 (2014), 13.  Morgan notes in the same that 
“Many scholars agree that the most sophisticated statement Origen wrote on resurrection and bodies is in a brief 
excerpt of a commentary of Psalm 1, quoted in Methodius of Olympus’ On the Resurrection and preserved in Greek 
in Epiphanius’ Panarion 64,” and that in Epihpanius’ text, “the comments are meant to serve as examples of 
Origen’s heterodox view of resurrected bodies…”. 
29 Ibid., 13. 
30 Ibid., 15, 16. 
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refashions out of the earthly and natural body a spiritual body, which can dwell in the heavens (PA 
II.10.3).31 
As Morgan points out, this governing principle over the body functions in conjunction with 
bodily change such that the body is a means through which the purification of the soul can occur 
— the following resurrection is the merit of these actions.32 
Therefore, although Origen received criticism for not placing enough importance on the 
physical aspect of the bodily resurrection, it is nevertheless the case that Origen saw the 
necessity of maintaining the indissoluble relationship between body and spirit: 
…there is not one body which we now use in lowliness and corruption and weakness and a 
different one which we are to use hereafter in incorruption and power and glory, but that this same 
body, having cast off the weaknesses of its present existence, will be transformed into a thing of 
glory and made spiritual…(PA III.6.6.).33   
Thus it appears that Origen not only acknowledged the reality of the spiritual body but was 
determined to show, through philosophically supportive principles, how such a body 
simultaneously demonstrated the permanency of the human person and its capacity for mimesis 
of the divine. Yet in doing so, Origen is simply attempting to maintain the balance, on one hand, 
of a real deifying change taking place in the Christian believer while also not denying the 
 
31 As quoted in Morgan, Ibid., 16. 
32 Ibid., 16, 17. 
33 As quoted in Morgan, Ibid., 18.  There is debate, however, as to whether Origen fully agreed with the 
perpetuity of bodily existence; Morgan points out that Joseph Trigg argues that “If the end really is like the 
beginning…that material, bodily existence will cease when God is all in all – must be his preference.”  As 
shown above in Morgan and others arguments for Origen’s confirmation of embodiment in all stages of 
spiritual life, however, Origen does require a specific bodily role in the hereafter, and given Origen’s 
emphasis on the spiritual body, as well as his maintaining of a mirroring of the beginning that occurs in the 
consummation of all things, then Origen must conform to the scriptural reference of bodily resurrection in 
his pre-existence theory; rational beings exist in some form of embodiment.  Morgan chalks this up to a 
willingness on Origen’s part to “sideline a systematic commitment to the axiom (of pre-existence) in light 




essential role the body plays in the identity of the believer.  In other words, he was attempting to 
stay true to paradoxical combination of polarity and unity that is found in Paul’s description of 
the spiritual body, in which Paul repeatedly uses contrasting imagery to denote the disparity 
between the physical and spiritual bodies, without denying their interrelatedness. 
 This language of distinction shows up elsewhere in Paul — and neither is it lacking in 
Origen.  The premise of deification depends strongly on a fundamental change taking place in 
the human person which is due to a primarily spiritual influence but which at the same time has 
an effect on the physical dimension.  This is most prominent in the transition from a physical to 
spiritual body but changes in the earthly life of the believer are also evident: 
And we all, who with unveiled faces contemplate the Lord’s glory, are being transformed into his 
image with ever-increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit.34 
 
Finlan notes that this transition presently takes place for the Christian and is one of multiple 
examples in the Pauline literature of anastiform living: “living as though already in the kingdom 
of God and receiving eternal light and truth.”35  He goes on to sum up his essay with the 
following takeaway: 
It proves to be impossible, therefore, to discuss theosis in Paul without considering, however 
briefly, the sacrificial interchange accomplished by the death of Christ, and without spelling out 
the believer’s necessary participation in the Savior’s cruciform life so that one may also share in 
his anastiform living.  Since the anastiform benefits begin already in this lifetime, an exclusive 
focus on sin and deliverance would suppress a crucial aspect of Paul’s teaching: gaining an ability 
to discern the will of God, and being transformed into Christlikeness, which can truly be called 
 
34 2 Cor 3:18; see Finlan’s discussion of this verse and its relation to theosis in Finlan, “Can We Speak of Theosis in 
Paul,” 75-77. 
35 Finlan, “Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul,” Partakers of the Divine Nature, 76-77. 
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theosis.  Thus, theosis in Paul always involves both cruciform and anastiform living, but points to 
a thoroughly anastiform destiny, when the believer will “be with Christ” (Phil 1:23).36 
 
 Origen takes up the theme of anastiform living throughout his writings, often as a way of 
showing the progress that the spiritual believer can make as they develop into an image of the 
Word.  A notable example of this is Origen’s concept of “spiritual senses”.  For Origen, as the 
believer comes to be deified, partaking more deeply of the life of God, it follows that there is an 
increase in one’s spiritual awareness.  The opposite is also true, in that as one becomes more 
spiritually aware, they are able to further partake of anastiform living. 
The following passage from Origen’s Commentary on The Song of Songs, is an 
interesting depiction of this phenomenon.  In it, Origen digresses on the topic of spiritual senses, 
based on the verses 1:3-4 of The Song of Songs.37  Interestingly, Paul is primarily referenced, 
and Solomon, who Origen understood as the inspired author of The Song of Songs, secondarily, 
to authenticate this concept.  We will quote Origen in length in order to better convey the full 
meaning of this unique passage: 
Wherefore we also, from the position where we find ourselves, earnestly beg the hearers of these 
things to mortify their carnal senses.  They must not take anything of what has been said with 
reference to bodily functions, but rather employ them for grasping those divine senses of the inner 
man; as Solomon himself teaches us saying: Thou shalt find the divine meaning, and as Paul also 
writes to the Hebrews, as we remarked before, about the perfect who have their senses trained to 
discern good and evil.  He points out that there are other senses in man besides these five bodily 
senses; these other senses are acquired by training, and are said to be trained when they examine 
 
36 Ibid., 78. 
37 “Thy name is as ointment emptied out.  Therefore have the maidens loved Thee, have they drawn Thee.  We will 
run after Thee into the fragrance of Thine ointments.”  As quoted in Origen, The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4.  
The translation used is that by R.P. Lawson, The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies, trans., R.P. Lawson, 
(Mahwah, New Jersey: The Newman Press, 1956), 74. 
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the meaning of things with more acute perception.  For what the Apostle says about the perfect 
having their senses trained to discern good and evil must not be taken carelessly and in any sense 
one likes. 
To make its meaning clearer, therefore, let us if you like take an example from these bodily senses, 
and thus we shall come at length to those divine senses which Scripture calls those of the inner 
man.  If, then, the bodily eye has the faculty of sight and there is no obstacle in the way, it will 
perceive the colours and sizes and qualities of bodies in their entirety and without any deception; 
for if the power of sight be hindered either by dimness or by any other weakness, so that it thinks a 
white thing to be red or a black one green, or that a crooked twisting thing is straight, the mental 
judgement undoubtedly will be disturbed, and one thing will be done in place of another.  And in 
the same way, if the interior vision, instead of being trained by learning and diligence so as to 
acquire the power of discerning good and evil through much experience, gets its eyes misted as it 
were by ignorance and inexperience, or bleary as from the feebleness induced by some disease, it 
cannot manage to discern good from evil by any means at all. And so it happens that it does bad 
things instead of good, and rejects the good in favour of the bad. And if you apply this analogy, of 
which we have treated in regard to the sight of body and soul, to hearing, and taste and smell and 
touch also, and work out the parallel between all the several powers of the bodily senses according 
to their kind and the corresponding powers of the soul, you will then clearly perceive what training 
should be undertaken in each case, and what correction ought to be set going. 
We have digressed somewhat over this, because we wished to show that the sense of smell, by 
which the Bride and the maidens perceived the fragrance of the Bridegroom’s ointments, denotes 
not a bodily faculty, but that divine sense of scent which is called the sense of the interior man.  
This power of perception, therefore, having once picked up the scent of Christ, in so far as it is 
sound and healthy leads on thenceforward from life unto life.  But if, on picking up the scent of 
Christ, it be not healthy, it casts a man down from death unto death, according to him who said: 
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For we are the good odour of Christ, to some from life to life, but to others the odour of death unto 
death.
38 
 It may seem that Origen is stretching the originally intended meaning of The Song of 
Song verses on which he elaborates, as well as the way in which he incorporates other scriptural 
verses to support his exegesis.  That Origen is taking some liberties is not argued against here. 
Yet there are a few things that might suggest why Origen explained these verses this way and 
which actually supports his “spiritual senses” concept as in keeping with a scriptural and 
specifically Pauline approach.  The first is that in his commentary above, Origen references 
Hebrews, which he understands as a Pauline text, in order to explain how only those who are 
“perfect” through training are able to truly discern the good from the bad.  Origen tends to place 
the concept of moral perfection within a spectrum of “maturity” elsewhere in his writings, such 
as in his treatise On Prayer, where he relates this theme to similar passages in which a 
relationship is forged between a specific stage of spiritual maturity and the type of spiritual 
sustenance corresponding to that stage.  Thus, there is “milk” for the “babes,” “solid food” for 
the “perfect,” “food for an athlete” for the “more perfect” and even “vegetables” for the “weak 
man.”39 
The concept of spiritual maturity, present in both Pauline scripture40 and Origen’s 
writings, implies that some kind of change can take place in the believer that puts them further 
along the Christian path (setting their stage of maturity) and thus establishes them as better able 
to take in the truths and teachings of God (the type of food they can “consume”).  It would be 
 
38 Origen, The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4 (Lawson, 79-81). 
39 Origen, On Prayer XXVII.3-5.  The translation used is that by Rowan A. Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to 
Martyrdom, Prayer, and Selected Works, trans., Rowan A. Greer, (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1979), 138-
139. 
40E.g., 1 Cor 3:1-3 is referenced in Greer’s translation in Origen, On Prayer XXVII.5 (Greer, 139).  See also Phil 
3:12-15.   
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necessary that this maturity be associated with the inner man or, for Origen, the “spiritual man,” 
since it is the inner man that is to be associated with that which is spiritual.  This brings us to our 
second point. 
 The key Pauline phrase “inner man” is used not only once in the above passage but three 
times (albeit once it is translated here as “interior man”).  Here, Origen is identifying the inner 
man with the spiritual man.  For Origen, it is obvious that just as the physical body has physical 
senses, so the inner man or spiritual aspect of man must have spiritual senses.  Combining this 
with the concept of spiritual maturity and discernment, and looking to develop a type from the 
Old Testament Song of Songs that fulfills the new, Origen assumes “spiritual senses” as agents 
of anastiform living and thus of the deifying process: 
But to those who follow the leading of their subtle spiritual sense and perceive that there is greater 
truth in the things that are not seen, than there is in those that are seen, and that the things, 
invisible and spiritual are closer to God than are the bodily and visible, this kind of interpretation 
will doubtless commend itself as that which they should follow and embrace; for they recognize 
that this is the way of understanding truth that leads to God.41 
 
A takeaway from Origen using Pauline elements to showcase his spiritual senses concept is that 
Origen recognizes, to use Finlan’s terminology, an anastiform motif in Paul.  Origen is showing 
the effects that take place in the life of the believer as a result of grace and as a pre-figurement of 
the life to come, and has no issue with bringing in the words of “the Apostle” to substantiate his 
claims, in that he sees Paul doing the same. 
 
41 Origen, The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4  (Lawson, 81). 
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The “odour” verse is referenced earlier in the commentary by Origen, however, where he 
relates it to a few lines in The Song of Songs which deal with the “ointment” of the bridegroom.  
This passage of Origen’s commentary introduces the maturity theme discussed above, all the 
while describing the position and development of either the soul or, at one point in the passage, 
the Church, in its relationship with God.  At its conclusion, the passage confronts the reader with 
the possibility of divine assimilation within a human-divine spousal relationship.  This passage is 
also important here in that it builds upon our above-mentioned points, particularly in relation to 
Paul’s “inner man” and the anastiform life.  Here, however, Origen goes further in identifying 
the telos of the deifying process: 
‘Thy name is as ointment emptied out.  Therefore have the maidens loved thee, have they drawn 
thee.  We will run after thee into the fragrance of thine ointments.’  The literal interpretation, 
which we followed in treating the foregoing passages, holds good also for that which is before us 
now, until some change occurs between the characters; the dramatic sequence, which we accepted 
in this interpretation, in fact requires this.  We may well see in these words a certain prophecy, 
uttered by the Bride herself concerning Christ, to the effect that at Our Lord and Saviour’s coming 
it should come to pass that His name should be so spread abroad throughout the globe and over the 
whole world, as to make it an odour of sweetness in every place; as the Apostle also says: We are 
the good odour of Christ in every place; to the one indeed the odour of death unto death, but to the 
others the odour of life unto life.42 
 
With the introduction of this verse, Origen notes the introduction of “the maidens,” the 
allegorizing of which he will take up throughout the next six paragraphs.  As mentioned above, 
Origen is also looking to develop a type from the Old Testament which is to be shown to be 
fulfilled in the New; here he does so by identifying what is spoken about the key theme of “odor” 
 
42 Ibid., (Lawson, 74-75).  See also 2 Cor 2:14-16, as noted in the same. 
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in The Song of Songs passage as a prophecy which is echoed and authenticated in a Pauline 
verse that bears a similar metaphor.  The “fragrance of thine ointments,” in The Song of Songs 
passage and the “good odour of Christ,” in the Pauline verse describe the ubiquity of the name of 
Christ throughout the whole earth.  We can perhaps assume that Origen is here referring to, even 
in his own day, both the tremendous success of Christianity as a burgeoning religion and the 
expectation of its continued growth, specifically by means of Christian believers who were called 
by Christ to “Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of 
the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I commanded you; 
and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the age.”43 
For, had it been the odour of life unto life for all men, we should surely have read in this place too:  
‘They have all loved Thee and have drawn Thee.’  But now it says that when ‘Thy name’ has been 
emptied out as ointment, ‘have they loved Thee,’ not those little old souls clothed in the old man, 
nor yet the spotted and wrinkled, but that ‘the maidens’ have done so—that is to say, the young 
souls growing up in years and in beauty, who are always being made new and renewed from day 
to day, as they put on the new man, who is created according to God.44 
 Origen continues his commentary by explaining the meaning of the maidens – they are 
the “young souls”, identified with the “new man,” as opposed to the “old souls” who are 
identified with the “old man.”  As with before, the Pauline terminology is on full display here – 
the young souls are the believing Christians who are growing in their faith, as evidenced by the 
statement that they are “renewed,” “putting on the new man,” and are “created according to 
God.”45  This is another description of anastiform living. Origen references the Pauline verses in 
 
43 Matthew 20:19-20. 
44 Origen, The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4 (Lawson, 75).   
45 “Therefore we do not lose heart, but though our outer man is decaying, yet our inner man is being renewed day by 
day.”  2 Cor 4:16; “But you did not learn Christ in this way, if indeed you have heard Him and have been taught in 
Him, just as truth is in Jesus, that, in reference to your former manner of life, you lay aside the old self, which is 
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Ephesians of the new man being a creation made according to the likeness of God in order to 
describe how the growing Christian makes real spiritual progress in realizing his or her potential 
as an image of God.  In fact, in a homily on Genesis, when discussing man as being made 
according to the image of God, Origen also references 2 Corinthians 4:16 as evidence for the role 
of spiritual progress in allowing one to fulfill this potential.46   
 After this, Origen changes gears in order to explain the role of the Word in this process.  
Specifically, how the Word made himself flesh and “emptied himself out” so that the young, 
maiden souls would be able not only to love God, but also draw him to themselves, to the point 
that the Word would become ingrafted onto their minds, such that they are not only able to 
penetrate the meanings of the divine mystery of the Word’s coming in the flesh but also to grasp 
the love whereby “the Immortal” would die for the salvation of all men on the cross.  Presumably, 
to draw the Word to one’s self would require some action on the part of the believer.  Origen 
doesn’t elaborate on this point, but does maintain that “every soul draws and receives to itself the 
Word of God according to the measure of its capacity and faith,” thereby precluding a God who 
takes total responsibility for the spiritual development of the Christian; it’s at least somewhat on 
the individual to grow in their faith, at least insomuch as they are able to.   
 Even attempts at the fulfillment of this responsibility are bolstered by God’s grace, 
however, in that God makes himself attractive to the young soul, thus allowing it to be filled with 
a certain vigor for Him.  Allegorizing the fragrances of the bridegroom as the divine mysteries of 
 
being corrupted in accordance with the lusts of deceit, and that you be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on 
the new self, which in the likeness of God has been created in righteousness and holiness of the truth.” Eph 4:20-23. 
Both verses, as well as the suggested connection to Genesis (Gen 1:26 is specifically referenced) are referred to in a 
note by Lawson within the corresponding paragraph in Origen, The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4 (Lawson, 75).  
Additionally, 2 Cor 4:16 is referred to in a note by Heine in the corresponding passage in Origen, Homilies on 
Genesis I.13 (Heine, 66).    
46 Origen, Homilies on Genesis I.13 (Heine, 66).   
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the Word, experienced by the maiden souls, Origen references Paul’s running of the race 
metaphor to support the idea that the maiden souls, having caught the “fragrance” of God, build 
momentum and now begin to run towards Him.  Finishing his line of thought, Origen links back 
to the phrase “Thy name is as ointment emptied out,” in order to speculate on the difference in 
effect between the name of the Word and the Word’s very self.  The result is that Origen can 
conclude that if the name has such an effect, as explained above, how much more will the 
Word’s very self effect certain changes in the believer?47 
But let me ask you this: if His Name only, that became as ointment emptied out, had such effect 
and stirred the maidens so, that first they drew Him to themselves and then, when they had got 
Him with them, perceived the fragrance of His ointments and ran after Him forthwith; if all these 
things, I say, were brought about by virtue of His Name alone, what do you think His very Self 
will do?  What strength, what vigour will these maidens get from it, if ever they are able by some 
means to attain to His actual, incomprehensible, unutterable Self?  I think myself that if they ever 
did attain to this, they would no longer walk or run, but, bound as it were by the bands of His love, 
they would cleave to Him, and would have no further power ever to move again.  For they would 
be one spirit with Him, and that which is written: As Thou, Father, in me and I in Thee are one, so 
may these also be one in Us, would be fulfilled in them.48 
 In analyzing this passage, and in the context of the preceding points laid out above, it is 
evident that the relationship between the Christian and God is a mortal-divine give and take, 
whereby the Word ultimately empowers the believer in their choice to pursue Him.  Origen thus 
sustains the implicit free will of the human person, while maintaining the central function of 
God’s grace, manifested most fully in the incarnation of the Word, in the life of the believer.   
 
47 Origen. The Song of Songs Commentary 1.4 (Lawson, 74-77). 
48 Ibid., (Lawson 77). 
50 
 
 By interpreting the Johaninne verse, “As Thou, Father, in me and I in Thee are one, so 
may these also be one in Us,”49 as a prophetic depiction of the deification, via a permanent 
mortal-divine union, of future Christ-followers, Origen brings his readers face to face with the 
telos of the Christian life.  Although not able to describe by what means this union would 
become possible, Origen undoubtedly confirms it here not only as a possibility, but necessarily 
as the relationship that God desires to have with those who follow him.  It should be noted that 
this seems to be a choice verse for Origen in substantiating his claim for the deified and union-
based form of the Christian telos, in that he also alludes to it in an identical sense in a discussion 
of the final consummation of all things in On First Principles.50 
 As before with the Pauline term “inner man” Origen connects this Johannine verse to 
man’s creation story in Genesis: 
All therefore, who come to him and desire to become participants in the spiritual image by their 
progress, “are renewed daily in the inner man” according to the image of him who made them, so 
that they can be made similar to the body of his glory,” but each one in proportion to his own 
powers.  The apostles transformed themselves to his likeness to such an extent that he could say of 
them, “I go to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.”  For he had already 
petitioned the Father for his disciples that the original likeness might be restored to them when he 
says: “Father,” grant “that just as you and I are one so also they may be one in us.”51 
 
 
49 “I pray not only for them, but also for those who will believe in me through their word, so that they may all be one, 
as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be in us, that the world may believe that you sent me.”  
John 17:20-21.  See also Lawson’s footnote that references John 17:21 in the corresponding passage in Origen, The 
Song of Songs Commentary 1.4 (Lawson, 77). 
50 I.e., “The Lord himself also in the gospel points out that these things will not only come to pass but will come to 
pass by his own intercession, when he deigns to make this request to the Father for his disciples: ‘Father, I will that, 
where I am, they also may be with me’, and, ‘as I and thou art one, so they may be one in us’.  Here indeed the 
likeness seems, if we may say so, to make an advance and from being something similar to become, ‘one thing’; for 
this reason undoubtedly, that in the consummation or end God is ‘all in all’.” Origen, On First Principles III.VI.1 
(Butterworth, 245-246). 
51 Origen., Homilies on Genesis I.13 (Heine, 66). 
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This quote serves as a good example of how Origen distinguishes between “image” and  
“likeness.”  A further indication of Origen’s delineation between the two is again found in his On 
First Principles, in his eschatological discussion of the final consummation of all things in God.  
Since for Origen, the end is to be like the beginning, there is a need to explain how God’s 
making man, “in the image of God,” is to be eschatologically fulfilled.52  “Likeness,” becomes 
for Origen the fulfillment of “image.” While all rational creatures possess the image of God, God 
allows those who strive to imitate him to come to bear his likeness.  It is fitting therefore that a 
perfect likeness is reserved for the end times, when the likeness advances to a unitary 
participation in God as He is “all in all.”53 
 Of note to our discussion is that Origen determines “likeness” similarly to Plotinus, as we 
can see from Plotinus’ own words: 
But when he reaches higher principles and different measures he will act according to these.  For 
instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but 
will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life 
of the good man which civic virtue requires.  He will leave that behind, and choose another, the 
life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like.  Likeness to good 
men is the likeness of two pictures of the same subject to each other; but likeness to the gods is 
likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves.54  
 
52 I.e., “If then the end is renewed after the pattern of the origin and the issue of things made to resemble their 
beginning and that condition restored which rational nature once enjoyed when it had no need to eat of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil, so that all consciousness of evil has departed and given place to what is sincere and 
pure and he alone who is the one good God becomes all things to the soul and he himself is all things not in some 
few or in many things but in all things, when there is nowhere any death, nowhere any sting of death, nowhere any 
evil at all, then truly God will be all in all.” Origen, On First Principles III.IV.3 (Butterworth, 248). 
53 Ibid., III.IV.1 (Butterworth, 245-246). 
54 Plotinus, Ennead I.2.7.  The translation used is that by A.H. Armstrong, Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, trans., 
A.H. Armstrong, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1989), 146-147.  Cf. the same passage from 
Enneads I.2.7 as found in Plotinus, The Enneads, ed., Lloyd P. Gerson, trans., George Boys-Stones et al, (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 62; “But advancing on to the greater principles, and the other measures, he 
will act according to those.  For example, he will not locate the act of self-control in imposing a measure, but in 
separating himself entirely as far as possible, absolutely not living the life of the good human being, which civic 




As with Origen, for Plotinus likeness to God is not only possible but the ideal.  Also similarly, 
Plotinus advocates a mastery over one’s lower nature in order to achieve this objective.  For his 
part, however, Plotinus stresses a complete separation from this nature, whereas Origen is more 
inclined to stress an ordering of one’s lower, physical nature beneath that of the spiritual.  It is 
also interesting to note here that while Plotinus is not using the biblical term “image of God,” he 
notes that “likeness to the gods is likeness to the model.”  Thus also for Plotinus, there is an 
archetype the nature of which is altogether different than human nature, but which humans may 
grow in resemblance of nevertheless.   
 The above section has served to highlight Origen’s theological anthropology as supported 
through his interpretation of Paul, and how this has contributed to his concept of deification.  
Essentially, Origen takes the concept of Paul’s “inner man” and relates it to the philosophical 
notion of the spirit of man.  Therefore, this “inner man” is placed above the “outer” or physical 
aspect of man’s being, that which is concerned with pleasing the body over and above the spirit 
and therefore subject to sin. By taking on the “inner man,” one is able to re-establish one’s 
spiritual senses and thereby commune with the Word.  By being “spiritual” and practicing virtue, 
this communication with the Word results in progressive steps towards a greater degree of 
spiritual maturity.  This is made possible through the grace of God but also due to God’s making 
man in his image, and allowing him to grow in likeness of him.  The end result of this process is 
a cleaving to God, not unlike that of a marital union, whereby God and the believer become one. 
 The above verses from The Song of Songs serve as an example of how Origen often 
refers back to Pauline scripture in order to authenticate the claims he is making.  Here, we have 
 
good human beings.  Assimilation to good human beings is making an image of an image, one from another.  But 
the other assimilation is like making an image according to the paradigm.”   
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shown that Origen relies on Paul for supporting themes of his theological anthropology, namely: 
the role of the inner and outer man, spiritual maturity (involving a progression in the spiritual 
life), spiritual senses, and anastiform living, or a living of the life of the Resurrection here and 
now, which signifies the glorified life to come.  All of these themes relate to the telos of union 
with God, which is essentially the goal of deification.  
 In the next section, we will deal further with how Origen treats the role of the Logos, 
which was touched upon in this section.  There is still the question of, for Origen, who or what 
the Logos was, how does the Logos relate to the Trinity, how does it relate to Jesus, and 
furthermore, what role does its agency play in the deification of the believer?  In this way, we 
will build upon the above and will later be able to connect in more detail the agency of the Logos 
to the central components of Origen’s theological anthropology.  With this in mind, let us delve 










III. Origen and the Role of the Logos 
Above has been presented Origen’s views on the human person and their capacity to 
reflect God’s image and likeness.  Here we will examine how this is possible, specifically 
through the agency of the Logos.  As Joseph S. O’Leary points out, the Logos plays a central 
role in Origen’s thought.  Meanwhile, he describes the Logos in Hellenistic philosophy as: 
…a stable cosmic principle (arche), [which] was the central mediating instance between the 
empirical world and the realm of ultimate reality, and at the same time was the unifying bond of 
the cosmos and of human society.  In the Hebrew Scriptures the creative divine Word, or Logos, 
had a semiautonomous existence (Isa. 55:11; Wis 18:15) and became identified with Wisdom (Sir. 
24:3)… whose mediating role in creation and salvation was assigned, in the Johannine prologue 
and the Christological hymns of Colossians and Ephesians, to Christ, the Logos made flesh.1   
Philo saw the Logos as the actualizer of the divine Ideas as well as the instrument of God 
through which the world is made.  The Ideas resided in this divine-reason principle as logoi 
spermatikoi, the seeds which the Logos would “plant” in order to bring about the created 
cosmos.2  The Logos was also for Philo an eikon or image of God, himself the source or 
paradigm of the Logos, while all created things are an image of the Logos, itself being the 
archetype.3  In these respects, one can see that Origen is similar to Philo in his understanding of 
the relation between God and the Logos.  A crucial distinction comes in the Christian 
connotations that Origen received and applied to the term, themselves coming from the usage of 
the Logos in the Gospel of John.  In a typical Origenian methodological fashion, Origen sought 
 
1 Joseph S. O’Leary, “Logos” The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed., John Anthony McGuckin, (Louisville, 
Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 142-143. 
2 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 159-160. 
3 Ibid., 160. 
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to detect the presence and influence of the Logos throughout the scriptures, particularly through 
typological constructs.  
 In a way similar to Philo, Origen views the Logos as Wisdom communicated to the world.  
This Wisdom has its subsistence in the Father, from which it is born, while the Logos has its 
subsistence in Wisdom.  This means essentially that the Son, while receiving his being from the 
Father, is Wisdom in that it is the hypostasis in which the ultimate pattern of all things is 
contained, while the Logos is the term used to describe the same hypostasis but as communicated 
to the world.  As an example of this, Origen points out that based on the biblical account, God 
made all things in wisdom through the Word.4  Here we are not far from Philo’s Ideas (Wisdom) 
as activated by the Logos who as divine Reason is itself an instrument and Image of God.  A 
major distinction of the identity of the Logos for Origen and Philo, however, comes down to 
Christological ramifications.  Furthermore, Origen recognizes the Logos’ role as a hypostasis, 
and explicitly defines what he means by referring to Wisdom’s hypostatic existence in On First 
Principles I.II.2: 
Let no one think, however, that when we give him the name ‘wisdom of God’ we mean anything 
without hypostatic existence, that is, to take an illustration, that we understand him to be not as it 
were some wise living being, but a certain thing which makes men wise by revealing and 
imparting itself to the minds of such as are able to receive its influence and intelligence.5 
 
Origen clarifies immediately after this statement that he is defining the only begotten Son of God 
as “God’s wisdom hypostatically existing.”6  It is to be noted here that Origen is not simply 
couching Wisdom as a component of God’s being but retaining it as a personal being; it may be 
 
4 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 2.90 (Heine, 117). 




the case here that his expression that “we understand him to be not as it were some wise living 
being,” is not so much to de-emphasize the personhood of the Logos but rather to emphasize the 
Logos’ role as God’s begotten Wisdom and to point out that God’s wisdom, as the basis and 
source of all wisdom, is something substantially different than a supremely wise intellect. That 
Origen gives the terminology of the “Son” a preeminent place in his hierarchy of names, would 
suggest that for Origen, the personhood of the deuteros theos, or Second God, is of the highest 
value and most suitable in identifying the precise nature of the Logos.7 
 Origen, commenting on the first verses of John, also posits similar opinions to Philo 
concerning the Logos’ role in creation.  This can especially be seen in the way that Origen and 
Philo similarly theorized the role of the Logos in regards to the creation of human beings: 
When Origen expounds Scripture, and the books of Moses in the Pentateuch, he habitually takes 
over themes that are found in Philo.  This starts with the interpretation of the creation of the world 
and of humankind, and the fall of the first humans into sin.  Unfortunately most of the 
Commentary on Genesis is lost, but the remaining fragments suggest heavy use of Philonic 
themes…Just as Philo did, Origen attaches great importance to the biblical doctrine that human 
beings are created “according to the Logos,” which means they are not the direct image of God, 
but first, images of his Logos.  For Origen, however the Logos is identified with both the 
preexistent Christ and the historical person of Jesus, a doctrine that Philo would not have 
understood.8 
In reference to Scripture, Origen puts forth that all things have come to be according to 
the thoughts of what will be, which were prefigured by God in wisdom.  In relation therefore, to 
 
7 See O’Leary, “Logos,” 144.  Speaking of Origen’s depiction of the Logos, O’Leary posists in the same that “The 
name of Son is the principal name of Christ, the one identifying him as a person in relation to the Father.  The other 
names nest within this, as it were.  In the chain of epinoiai, the title Wisdom precedes that of Logos.  Their relation 
again suggests the Stoic concept of immanent and expressed Logos.”  
8 Runia, “Philo of Alexandria,” 170-171. 
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John 1:1, it is the Word which transmits wisdom and is received as the beginning of all things.9  
The Word acts as a creator, and also as the firstborn of Creation; the Word is the image of the 
invisible God , and the Father is his beginning.10  Human beings, meanwhile, are images of 
Christ.  So to put it in a formulaic sense, what Origen would say is as follows: Human beings are 
the image of Christ while Christ is the image of the Father.  This formula gives a basic 
understanding as where to start to apply the human person’s image and likeness of God in its 
relation to the Logos or Word.  Below I will posit three examples from Origen’s writings to 
showcase this relationship and how Origen envisions it. 
 For the first we will go back to the Genesis creation account, specifically Origen’s 
homily on the first creation story where it describes man as being made according to God’s 
image.  As Origen here explains, Christ, who is the firstborn of all creation, is really the image of 
the Father.  Man therefore, really images the Word, through whom the Father is seen, but does 
not image the Father in the same way that Christ images the Father.  Men become partakers in 
the imaging of the Father, however, insomuch as they partake of Christ, the image of the Father 
and the true contemplator of the Father.  Origen additionally brings in the condescension of 
Christ to our present state by pointing out that Christ’s redemptive actions towards us were due 
to compassion on account of seeing humans lay aside their Christ-like images for images of the 
evil one.  Origen goes on to conclude that therefore all who go to Christ and contemplate him 
will surely advance in being transformed into the likeness of Christ.11   
In his Treatise on Prayer, Origen lays out a formula similar to the formulaic expression 
mentioned above, saying that when Christians come to imitate Christ, “the image of the Man 
 
9 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 1.111 (Heine, 56-57). 
10 Ibid., 1.104 (Heine, 55). 
11 Origen., Homilies on Genesis I.13 (Heine, 63-67). 
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from heaven, who is Himself the image of God, is in them (those who imitate Christ).  The saints 
therefore, are an image of an image, since the son is the image.”  Origen goes on to conclude that 
it is possible therefore, by the coming of the Word of God to our souls, to become children of 
God, so long as one partakes of this Word of God.12 
Furthermore Origen says in his commentary on John that “the saint alone is rational,” 
precisely because it is the saint who fully participates in the Word of God, the Word synonymous 
with reason.13  As Origen explains in his Commentary on John 2.17 and 2.18, the Word of God is 
in unceasing contemplation of God the Father, who is the source of the Logos’ divinity.  
Therefore, participation by human beings in the Word of God is as a participation in this 
unceasing contemplation of the Father.  Henceforth, the soul is divinized through this 
(participated in) contemplation.  Interestingly, Origen differentiates between God the Father or 
Source of divinity and the Logos based on the greek article ho, which precedes theos in the 
Biblical text in John when describing the Father.14  As mentioned above, this is what garners the 
name of deuteros theos for the Logos when speaking of the Logos in reference to the Father, who 
is correspondingly given the moniker of autotheos.15 The Father is “the God” while the Logos is 
simply “God.”  Origen concludes from this that therefore all who participate in “the God’s” (the 
Father’s) divinity are rightly called God.  The first among these, however, is Christ, who is an 
archetype for all other “images” of God: 
The God, therefore, is the true God.  The others are gods formed according to him as images of the 
prototype.  But again, the archetypal image of the many images is the Word with the God, who 
was “in the beginning.”  By being “with the God” he always continues to be “God.”  But he would 
 
12 Origen, On Prayer XXII.4 (Greer, 124-125). 
13 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 2.114 (Heine, 124-125). 
14 Ibid., 2.17-18 (Heine, 98-99). 
15 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 145. 
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not have this if he were not with God, and he would not remain God if he did not continue in 
unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father.16 
Origen recognizes here the boldness of his statements, particularly in the declaration of 
other “gods,” and how this may cause offense.  To remedy this he immediately qualifies his 
statements.  It is beyond our scope here to go into a full account of how he does this but we can 
essentially refer back to what has been said earlier that in order to avoid putting human beings 
into the same classification of Christ, humans must first receive the Word in themselves, who is 
the source of reason, in continual contemplation of the Father, and the archetype.  He is also the 
autologos, in relation to the logos in each rational being. 17  Yet it is the God, the Father, who is 
the source of divinity, from whom ultimately the possibility to become god-like, or if one will, 





16 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 2.18 (Heine, 99). 













Above has been related Origen’s theological anthropology, with its Pauline basis and added  
Platonist inspired elements, as well as his Christology, which is Johaninne in its nature, albeit 
again with some Platonist inspirations.  These Platonist elements have much to do with how 
Origen assembles his cosmology, however, which in turn has effects on his overall Christology 
and theological anthropology.  In this section, we will delve further into how Origen synthesizes 
all of these components to form an authentic doctrine of deification, one that differs markedly 
from that of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus.  Furthermore, this section will identify 
Origen’s own self-awareness of the deification doctrine based on the terminology he utilizes 
when discussing deifying themes or principles.   
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 Origen, as a whole, rarely uses specific terms to describe deification, and even when he 
does his usage is more limited than that of his predecessor, Clement.  For example, Origen does 
not use the terms ἀποθέωσις or θεόω.  Origen, like Clement, does prefer the term θεοποιέω, 
although only uses it eight times in his writings in a Christian context.  As discussed earlier, 
Origen does not shy away from using the term gods (θεοί) as a way of describing the deified 
Christian.1 
 Norman Russell has pointed out in his The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic 
Tradition, that Origen’s use of deifying terminology is not philosophical, but biblical.  As an 
example, he states that Origen does not use deifying terms in the more philosophical On First 
Principles, but rather in works of biblical exegesis.  Russell also notes that Origen’s deification 
is less focused on dispassion, or ἀπάθεια, than is Clement’s.  Rather, Origen’s is more 
intellectually based, and further stresses participation in the eternal, as opposed to the incarnate 
Logos, although both recognize the initial need for the Word of God to initiate the deifying 
process in the believer.  As previously explored in this thesis, Origen’s focus is on the 
intellectual participation in the Logos’ own contemplation of the Father, with the Logos 
performing the role of autologos, or source of reason.2   
 Notably, when comparing the above perspectives, one can see a more Stoicised influence 
in Clement, with his emphasis on ἀπάθεια while Origen seems to be more representative of a 
Platonist view in which one scales the hierarchy of being through intellectual contemplation. 
This hearkens back to Plato’s depiction in the Phaedrus of the metaphorical charioteer that scales 
the heights to a beatific vision, achieved through intellectual contemplation.  While Origen’s 
 
1 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition,  141. 
2 Ibid., 144. 
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process of deification resembles Platonism in this respect, his view of the philosophical 
connotations of divinity and participation does in fact have some Stoic influence, as well.  In his 
Commentary on the Psalms, Origen cites the Stoic Herophilus in his distinction between that 
which is God ontologically, and that which is god via participation in God.3   Thus for Origen, 









 Origen’s doctrine of deification is rife with a sense of participation (μετοχή), yet he never 
specifically defines the term in any of his works.  However, it is not difficult to piece together a 
working definition of how Origen understood the term based on how he uses it in certain of his 
texts.  Russell identifies three implications from Origen’s discussion of participation which we 
will take up in turn and discuss below.  They are as follows: (i) the non-corporeal nature of 
participation; (ii) the fundamental kinship between participant and participated; (iii) the 
 
3 Ibid., 145. 
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distinction between a participation which is natural or ontological and one which is supernatural 
and dynamic.4  
 Before beginning this discussion, it should also be added that, regarding participation, as 
Russell puts it, “Origen is the first to integrate the concept into a coherent structure of Christian 
thought.  In other words, he is the first to give the Pauline image of participatory union in Christ 
a metaphysical rationale.”5  This is a noteworthy observation for a few reasons and has 
implications for our discussion.  First, it suggests that Origen is employing participation as a 
philosophical concept, but one that is of soteriological significance, and therefore of consequence 
in a life directed towards fulfilling the statutes of Christian virtue.6  Following this, it implies that 
Origen is taking it as a given that Paul teaches a doctrine of deification, even if in a latent form, 
and is using the concept of participation as a way to understand this concept inherent in the 
Pauline texts further.  Deification in Paul, as Russell points out, consists of Pauline imagery – 
that of, for example the “inner man” of 2 Corinthians 4:16 and the “renewing of the mind in the 
spirit” and “new self” of Ephesians 4:20-23.  In these depictions, Paul for his part, encourages 
and teaches his ecclesial audiences by means of elaborating on what their new status as Christian 
converts entails and the spiritual benefits and responsibilities derived thereof.  Origen, in turn, 
strives to give a metaphysical context to Paul’s supernatural imagery of the Christian life, 
specifically participatory union, and, as Russell maintains, is the first major Christian thinker to 
do so.7  In other words, Origen can find authentication of his participatory theology in Paul, even 
if Paul does not go into detail about it or if Origen needs to use philosophical concepts to further 
support this doctrine. 
 
4 Ibid., 147-148. 





 An example of this comes from Origen’s Commentary on the Romans.  In it, Origen 
elaborates on the theme of renewal in the Pauline texts, reflecting on both the verses noted 
above,8 as well as Colossians 3:109: 
For you must not imagine that the renewing of the life, which is said to have been done once, 
suffices.  On the contrary at all times and daily, this newness must, if it can be said, be renewed.  
For this is what the Apostle says, “Even if he who is our outer man is being corrupted, but he who 
is inner is being renewed from day to day.”  For just as the old is constantly aging and from day to 
day becoming older, so also this new one is constantly being renewed and there is never a time 
when his renewing is not increasing…So then let us walk in newness of life, showing ourselves 
daily to him who raised us with Christ as new persons and, so to speak, as increasingly more 
beautiful people, uniting the beauty of our face with Christ, as in a mirror and, beholding the 
Lord’s glory, let us be transformed into the same image by which Christ, rising from the dead, has 
ascended from earthly lowliness to the glory of the Father’s majesty.10 
 Here Origen is presenting the concept of renewal as a daily growing in the likeness of 
God.  He employs language that is suggestive of action on the part of the believer, but which has 
the effect of enabling participation, i.e., “showing,” “uniting,” and “beholding,” have the effect 
of transforming the believer into “the same image by which Christ, rising from the dead, has 
ascended from earthly lowliness to the glory of the Father’s majesty.”  The expression “the same 
image” could possibly represent the archetypal image which Christ possesses and which we 
discussed earlier in this thesis.  That is, this image is the direct image of the Father, and thus 
Origen is encouraging believers to be transformed into a Christ-like image which perfectly 
images the Father through virtuous efforts of uniting oneself to and making oneself like Christ. 
 
8 I.e., Eph 4:20-23 and 2 Cor 4:16. 
9 ‘...”who is being renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him.”’  This verse is 
as taken from Scheck’s translation and which is footnoted as Col 3:10 in the same.  Origen, Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans 5.8.12 (Scheck, 359). 
10 Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 5.8.13 (Scheck, 359-360). 
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 An important note in regard to the above commentary is that Origen is also explicitly 
stating that renewal is a daily process.  There is no “once and done.”  Rather, each day one must 
make efforts to grow more like Christ.  This complements Origen’s idea of spiritual maturity, in 
that each day any believer could find themselves in a different place on the spiritual path, 
depending on their efforts.  Origen therefore understands participation as a daily process with 
ever more possibility to grow in the likeness of God. 
 To return to our three main implications of deifying participation, we begin with the first 
point, that of “the non-corporeal nature of participation.”  Here we can hearken back to the point, 
discussed above made in Origen’s commentary on Genesis, that man made in the “image of God” 
refers to the spiritual component of man, since it would be impious to relate the physical aspect 
of man to God, who is purely spiritual.  It is understandable for Origen, therefore, that the 
deification process should be considered a primarily spiritual endeavor, which affects the 
transfiguration of man’s soul, as opposed to anything corporeally related. Indeed, Origen seems 
to be taking his cue from Philo, who previously had stated that “it is in respect of the mind, the 
sovereign element of the soul, that the word ‘image’ is used,” and that neither the image or 
likeness refers to human bodiliness.11   
 Secondly, “participation implies some kind of kinship both among co-participants and 
between participant and participated.  It has, as it were, both a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension.”12   The horizontal dimension consists of some kind of shared nature between the 
participant and the participated in.  In Origen’s exegesis, the image of God or likeness to God in 
 
11 George H. Van Kooten,  Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite 
Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity, (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 57.  
Quote taken from De opificio mundi, as quoted in the same. 
12 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 148. 
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human beings is the divine spark that allows for a sharing in that which is truly divine.  Some 
further elements of the human soul that make this relationship possible are that it possesses an 
immortality and incorruptibility; it is also capable of reason and “the contemplation of the 
intellectual light (i.e.) the divine nature.”13  From the vertical dimension, it is evident that man is 
participating in a supreme power, one that, in its existence, is superior to his or her own existence, 
and upon which their being, as well as deification, depends.  Russell points out that while during 
the first Origenist Controversy, Origen was accused of teaching that man and God held the same 
nature in common, his critics missed that in order for man to share in God’s divinity, the two 
must also be at the same time distinct from one another.14  Thus Origen does not envision 
deification as an absorption into divine “oneness,” and never does he describe it as such.  Indeed, 
even in his most Platonist aspects, Origen never approaches an idea of the annihilation or total 
transcendence of the individual into divine unity.  The closest to this that he affirms, is the 
indication that God is to be “all in all” in the final restoration of things, or apokatastasis.   
 The third point follows closely upon the second in that Origen shows a distinction 
between a dependency on God and participation in God that is supernatural or dynamic.  The 
first of these has to do with a dependency on God for our very being; it is God to whom we owe 
our creation and thus we take our life from his divine power which sustains us.  Our natural 
existence, therefore, and all that belongs to it, comes from God’s sustaining providence.  
Additionally, we receive spiritual faculties in a more latent or potential sense.  Meanwhile, the 
latter point refers to our own ability to choose and God’s actions of bestowing grace on us that 
allows us to participate further in God’s attributes. This is that which fulfills in us the “likeness” 
of God and therefore is properly called deification. 
 
13 Ibid., 148. 
14 Ibid., 148. 
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 It is this latter dynamic aspect that Russell claims is only found in Origen when compared 
to his Neoplatonist contemporary, Plotinus: 
When Origen’s use of participation is compared with that of his contemporary, Plotinus, it is 
striking that while they both share the same understanding of the ontological aspect of 
participation, the dynamic aspect is found only in the Christian writer.  Plotinus illuminates the 
nature of participation with the image of the circle.  The radii cannot exist without the central point.  
They take from it their origin and their being and therefore ‘participate in the point’ (Enn. IV.I.I. 
25-30).  The point itself, however, remains ‘in itself’ and without division.  In one sense it is the 
end of each radius; in another it is independent of the radii without extension or place.  The One is 
analogous to this.  It is not part of any being but ‘rides, so to speak, on all beings at once’ (Enn. 
IV.I.I 21-2). Everything as a series of ‘ones’ participates in the undivided One in accordance with 
its capacity, so that the One can be said to be omnipresent by participation (Enn. III.8.9. 22-4).  
The goal of the philosophical life is ascent to the One that is not one by participation (Enn. V.5.4 
1-5).  That is to say, philosophy prepares the individual intellect to receive the One not as a dim 
reflection in accordance with the intellect’s capacity but in its fullness and entirety.  The One, 
however, is totally detached from human affairs and takes no initiative in the process. 
The additional presence of a dynamic participation in Origen is to be attributed to the personal 
nature of the Christian divine hypostases.  As Crouzel has suggested, ‘the “gods” do not merely 
receive into themselves something of the reality of the Father and of the Word, the sons and the 
logika, are not merely the reflections of the Unique Son and the Logos, but they are made gods 
and sons and logika by the voluntary action of the two divine Persons’ (Crouzel 1956:173)…The 
Holy Spirit sanctifies those who choose to participate in him by faith, enabling them as they make 
progress in wisdom to participate more and more in Christ.  By proceeding along ‘the steep path 
of virtue’ they become through imitation of Christ ‘partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Pet. 1:4).15 
 
15 Ibid., 150-151. 
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 In other words, Origen’s concept of participation differs from Plotinus’ in that it is at its 
core relational, in the sense of being Personally relational, by sharing in the same relation as that 
which exists between and among the Persons of the Trinity.  Neither is it simply a beholding of 
or illumination from the divine, although those parts are certainly present, but a true becoming of 
the divine in the sense of an actively participated in sanctification of one’s human nature to the 
divine nature.   
Thus are the points which Russell maintains by which Origen understands participation.  
We are agreed here on these points and in their establishment for further understanding what 
Origen is meaning by participation.  However, the most important here, for our purposes, has to 
do with what has been mentioned above in the second point, namely that Origen maintains the 
distinction between the participant and that which is participated in.  This is important in that, for 










 Up until this point, little has been said of the Holy Spirit’s place in Origen’s theological 
framework or the Holy Spirit’s role in his doctrine of deification.  Although Origen seems to 
have upheld, in certain measures, a subordinationism of the Trinity, in other ways it is evident 
that he attempted to counterbalance this by clearly stating the Holy Spirit’s position as a 
hypostasis, and that the Trinity should be understood as devoid of “internal subordinate 
distinctions.”16  
 Although we have focused heavily on the role of the Logos, to whom belongs the 
position as source of reason and eternal contemplator of the Father, for Origen, the integration of 
the Christian in the life of the Trinity could not be said to take place without the activating 
influence of the Holy Spirit. Even though for Origen, the Holy Spirit is quite dependent upon the 
Son, both for its existence and for its virtuous elements, it is also the hypostasis that “delivers” 
the “goods” of sanctification. Indeed, it is the Holy Spirit that sanctifies persons in order that 
they become saints.  This is why, Origen explains, Christ speaks of the possibility of forgiveness 
of sin against himself, but that there is no forgiveness when one blasphemes against the Holy 
Spirit.  The Holy Spirit only helps those whom have already “been considered worthy” of him; 
therefore when they fall away, their sin is much greater since they have been offered privileged 
divine gifts and should know better, particularly due to the “counsels of the Spirit which is in 
them,” than to reject the Holy Spirit’s assistance.17 
 For those who do not reject the Holy Spirit’s assistance, they do not only receive gifts 
from him18 but also are able to participate in him.  Origen does not elaborate on the latter point 
 
16 Christoph Markschies, “Trinitarianism,” The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed., John Anthony McGuckin, 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004),  209. 
17 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 2.80 (Heine, 115). 
18 “I think, if I may put it this way, that the Holy Spirit supplies the material of the gifts from God to those who are 
called saints thanks to him and because of participation in him.  This material of the gifts which I mentioned is made 
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but he does say elsewhere in his Commentary on the Gospel of John that the Holy Spirit itself 
participates in the “aspects of Christ” such as his wisdom and justice.19  In this way it seems 
evident that the Christian believer is able to participate in the Logos through the assistance of the 
Holy Spirit and thus come to imitate the archetypal image of God.  Without the Spirit, however, 
this would seemingly not be possible. 
Interestingly, in Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs, there are echoes of the 
Phaedrus’ figurative language of the soul’s “wings” in Origen’s description of the role of the 
Holy Spirit’s effect on the believer: 
For I think that just as those who accept the death of Christ and mortify their members upon the 
earth are made partakers of the likeness of His death, so also those who receive the power of the 
Holy Spirit and are sanctified by Him and filled with His gifts, themselves become doves, even as 
He Himself appeared in the form of a dove.  And so, uplifted on the Holy Spirit’s wings, they fly 
from earthly and corporeal places to celestial ones.20 
 
Here, however, it is not the soul’s own wings that uplift them, as in the Phaedrus, but rather those 
of the Holy Spirit.  Origen maintains that, like those who are partakers of Christ’s death receive 
the likeness of it, so those who are sanctified by the Holy Spirit themselves become “doves.”  
Here we again see a transformation in the life of the believer, but expressed in the context of the 
third person of the Trinity, similarly to how one becomes like Christ by participating in the Son.  
There is still a strong similarity to Plato’s account, however, in the final lines where one leaves 
“earthly and corporeal places,” by flying to “celestial ones.” 
 
effective from God; it is administered by Christ; but it is subsists in accordance with the Holy Spirit.”  Ibid., 2.77 
(Heine, 114). 
19 Ibid., 2.76 (Heine, 114). 











 For Origen, the economy of God revolves around two things: the archetypal Logos which 
is in continual contemplation of the Father and the rational element of man which allows him or 
her to participate in said Logos (and hence its contemplation).  In essence, Origen finds these two 
elements in the Christological theology of John and in the participatory and anthropological 
accounts of Paul.  We believe that it can be argued that Origen’s whole theology of deification, 
and in fact his entire systematic theology, rest on these two areas of focus as their center.   In 
effect, then, this section serves as a summation of everything preceding in this thesis, and our 
objective here is to show how Origen blended the Logos theology of John with the theological 
anthropology of St. Paul as a way of introducing the Christian world to an increased 
understanding of the participatory nature of the divine economy. 
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 Our above conclusion can be supplemented by additional scholarly opinion, although we 
first have to take a side-step back to Philo in order to show how this is the case.  Concerning 
Philo, although he did not have recourse to New Testament texts, he tends to link the “image of 
God” and the “Logos” synonymously.  Regarding Philo’s synonymous identification of the terms, 
Van Kooten makes the point that: 
The fact that the ‘image of God’ is the equivalent of ‘Logos’ is extremely significant, as it shows a 
fundamental similarity between Pauline and Johannine theology.  In Philo, Paul’s language of the 
image of God and John’s terminology of the Logos meet.  The similarity between John and Philo 
also extends to the Platonic concept of the true, invisible light (see Phaedo 109E).  According to 
Philo, this invisible light is not equivalent to the Logos, but is ‘an image of the Logos the divine 
Logos.’  In John, however the two terms have become synonymous because Christ is both 
characterized as the Logos (e.g., John 1.1) and the true Light (John 1.9).  Using Philonic writings 
as a sort of ‘conversion table’, it now becomes possible to see that the way in which John phrases 
his Christology in terms of Logos and the true light is essentially the same as the manner in which 
Paul talks of Christ as the image of God.  It is Philo who shows that the image of God is closely 
related to the true, invisible light (De opificio mundi 31) and equivalent to ‘the Logos by whom 
the whole universe was framed.; (De specialibus legibus 1.81).21 
 
 
Here we see in Philo that there is already an understanding of the Logos being the “image of 
God.”  Later on, Van Kooten explains that, in the case of man, Philo did not consider man as an 
actual image of God, but rather as a sort of impress that gave man an authentic likeness to God.  
He does this by pointing out that every image falsifies the original, but that there is still a real 
likeness between God and man, and that this resides in the non-corporeal element of man. 
 
21 Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context, 56. 
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 This explanation of Philo’s linking of the “image of God” with the “Logos” is indeed 
likewise “extremely significant” to our current discussion on Origen.  Given that Origen did not 
shy away from drawing on Philo, and given that he likewise explicitly related the “image of God” 
with the Logos, we can see that what Van Kooten postulates as a “conversion table” scenario of 
reading Philo is actually the case for our later Alexandrian author.   
 A key difference, however, is that Origen goes further than Philo does in classifying man 
as an “image of the image” of God.  Man is an image of the Logos, whereas in Philo, he is an 
impress; this is likely due to Origen’s understanding that Christ must take up everything that is of 
man if man is to be likewise deified.  Therefore, there is no longer an obstacle to man being an 
actual “image” of God, presumably due to the mediating role played by the Logos.  Pauline 
theological anthropology thereby can be explicitly related to the Logos theology of John, 
resulting in the creation of a major cornerstone of Origen’s doctrine of deification. 
Besides Paul’s influence on his theological anthropology, other scholars have noted the 
importance of Origen’s reading of Paul in general for his doctrine of deification. Joseph W. 
Trigg, for example, notes the following concerning Origen’s Pauline exegesis: 
For Origen, rather, Paul was the apostle of spiritual transformation – the transformation of human 
apprehension of God from the oldness of the letter to the newness of the Spirit and the 
transformation of the believers into the image of Christ.  Paul was also the preeminent theoretician 
of spiritual interpretation of Scripture, which for us, is necessary for such transformation.22 
 
Norman Russell additionally states that,  
 
22 Joseph W. Trigg, Origen: The Early Church Fathers, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 49. 
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Although Origen adopts Clement’s vocabulary, his more ontological and dynamic participation 
through the Logos in God’s very life is new.  Clement’s use of ‘participation’ is close to that of 
Plato and Philo. It expresses the way in which creatures come to possess attributes which belong 
properly to a higher level of being.  Participation in the attributes of God is the means by which 
likeness to God is brought about.  Origen uses participation in a more dynamic way to signify, 
‘living with the life of God’.  God reaches out actively to human beings whose response, through 
participation in the life of the Trinity, makes them spirits, christs, and gods.  Indeed Origen’s 
doctrine may be said to be the re-expression in metaphysical terms of the Pauline metaphors of 
participatory union with Christ.  This is fitted into a highly speculative spiritual anthropology, but 
nevertheless was to prove highly influential.23 
Note here Russells points out that, “Origen’s doctrine may be said to be the re-expression in 
metaphysical terms of the Pauline metaphors of participatory union with Christ.”  These 
observations indicate a reading of Paul that did not fit the mold of later, western interpretations, 
such as those of Augustine and Luther, that focused on justification and salvation through 
grace.24   Instead, these observations highlight that Origen locks onto concepts in Paul that 
themselves aren’t dissimilar to Origen’s Platonic-Alexandrian philosophical heritage.   To return 
to our earlier usage of the term, one of these Pauline concepts is that of anastiform living, 
fulfilled in Christlikeness, which is mirrored by the virtuous ascent of the philosopher and his 
quest to “become like God so far is as possible,” in Platonism.  Yet just as is pointed out by 
Russell, Origen takes this concept further inasmuch as the believer becomes a “christ,” and 
enters into an intimate communion with God as a part of this dynamic process. 
We could suggest here that rather than Origen reading Platonism into Paul, Origen’s 
Platonic heritage impressed upon him, whether consciously or unconsciously, the need to 
 
23 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 154. 
24 Trigg, Origen: The Early Church Fathers, 49. 
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emphasize correlative scriptural themes.  For example, in contrast with the above-mentioned 
later, western theologies, Origen’s soteriological content does not err on the side of salvation 
from sin as a singular concept but rather depicts said notion as a deficiency of a positively 
conceived re-integration of one’s true supernatural nature.  In effect, a major strength of Origen’s 
position is that it rigidly maintains the metaphysical status of evil and sin as the absence of God’s 
goodness.  It does this by showing not only what one is saved from, but rather, by describing 
how much good there is to be gained (and therefore lost).  In this manner, one is confronted with 
a distinct choice — does one “gain” by serving God through the pursuit of spiritual excellence 
and thus attain to greater and greater perfection or does one forego and thereby “lose” such 
things in the pursuit of lesser, earthly desires which do not satisfy the requirements of one’s 
godly potential?   This again shows Origen’s insight into Pauline themes of deification which 
were overlooked by later theologians, while also displaying his commitment to provide a 
Christian alternative to Platonist notions of noetic perfection.   
To demonstrate Origen’s willingness to combine Pauline and Johannine themes in order 
to better explain his theology of deification, an example can be found one of Origen’s homilies 
on Genesis.  Previously quoted in this thesis, it is a prime example of Origen’s willingness to 
relate Pauline themes such as renewal, participation and Paul’s theological anthropology to 
Johannine Christology as a way to explain the process of deification. 
All therefore, who come to him and desire to become participants in the spiritual image by their 
progress “are renewed daily in the inner man” according to the image of him who made them, so 
that they can be made “similar to the body of his glory,” but each one in proportion to his own 
powers.  The apostles transformed themselves to such an extent to his likeness that he could say of 
them, “I go to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.”  For he had already 
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petitioned the Father for his disciples that the original likeness might be restored in them when he 
says, “Father,” grant “that just as you and I are one so also they may be one in us.”25 
 
To summarize, the above shows how Origen’s take on Paul allowed him to merge 
participatory theological anthropological motifs in Paul with Johannine Logos theology, the 
result of which is a major cornerstone of Origen’s doctrine of deification.  The believer, in 
potential an “image of God,” is transformed into an “image of the image,” the latter being the 
Logos, who is the perfect archetype for divine-man communion.  This transformation requires 
participation in the Logos, which allows the believer to take on the anastiform life, a mode of 
living that characterizes the progressively deified spiritual subject. 
For both Platonists and Christians, however, there has always been a tendency to 
compare the godly life with that which is its opposite.  As such, we will devote our next section 
to Origen’s conception of evil, and how this impacts his doctrine of deification. This approach 
will be beneficial for a few reasons.  First, an exploration of Origen’s conception of evil will help 
to clarify any remaining obscurities regarding why Origen upholds deification as the telos of the 
Christian life. This will occur by defining said telos in a negative way, by explaining what it is 
not and why it is necessary as a result of the way, in fact, evil operates in Origen’s cosmology.  
Secondly, this will be our final section in this thesis in that it will lead into a brief discussion of 
Origen’s eschatology and final restoration theology.  These latter elements play a role in 
Origen’s theology of deification but are also perhaps the most controversial elements of his 
theology, imbued as they are with Platonic similarities.  Therefore, we would be remiss if we 
were to ignore these elements as if they did not, in fact, have an impact on Origen’s theology of 
 
25 Origen, Homilies on Genesis I.13 (Heine, 66).  See also 2 Cor 4:16, Phil 3:21, John 20:17, and John 17-21-22, as 
cited in the original quote. 
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deification.  Yet in doing so, we will uncover the tenets of Origen’s theodicy that allow him to 
see evil, not as meaningless misfortune, characterized by destruction and chaos, but, surprisingly, 








Now according to us who boast that we belong to the Church, it is the good God who speaks these 
words.  This is the same God the Savior honors when he says, “No one is good except the one God, 
the Father.”  “The one who is good,” therefore, is the same as “the one who is.”  But evil or 
wickedness is opposite to the good, and “not being” is opposite to “being.”  It follows that 
wickedness and evil are “not being.”26  
 
 This quote, taken from Origen’s Commentary on John, can be found in a larger section in 
the Commentary which seeks to explain the phrase, ”without him nothing was made,” as found 
in John 1:3. The quote is useful to begin our discussion with as it sets clear the status quo from 
the outset: good and evil are opposites where good is “being” and evil is “not being.”  What 
more is to be said concerning the metaphysical status of evil?  In Origen’s opinion, quite a bit 
more.   
 
26 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 2.96 (Heine, 119).  See also Mark S.M. Scott, Journey 
Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 24. 
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Indeed, the views as expressed in this reference are the backbone of Origen’s cosmic 
theodicy, and branching out from this backbone is the grand narrative of a cosmic opera: an epic 
that spans multiple aeons, and which tells the story of how each individual soul had enjoyed an 
unadulterated contemplative union with their Lord before falling from grace, only to be “caught” 
in “garments of skins,” — and all this before the dawn of realization of what a predicament they 
had gotten themselves into.  From there, the story can go in a myriad of directions – but there is 
for all the same ending, to return to the beginning, yet only after facing many trials and by 
completing the journey, the ascent back to one’s heavenly home. 
 Reading contemporary understandings back onto Origen’s view on evil, one could 
conclude that, at its core, Origen’s foundational position is quite an orthodox one.  That good and 
evil are opposites is in agreement with, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, who quoting 
Dionysius, states that “Evil is neither a being nor a good.”27 Indeed Aquinas defines evil 
specifically as the absence of good, the latter of which is being.   
 Yet just as Aquinas draws upon Aristotle in relating his theological propositions on evil, 
so we can find a correlation between Plato and Origen in regard to Origen’s position on evil.  
Indeed, Plato notes in the Theaetetus that, “God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but 
utterly perfect and righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn 
becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness.”28  Plato’s conception of evil seems to have more 
to do with the soul’s bodily entrapment within the material realm, which causes it to lose sight of 
the divine good that it should be in pursuit of.  The soul’s position in this situation is one in 
which the body is constantly impinging upon true philosophizing, through its “passions and 
 
27 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I, q. 48, a. 1. 
28 Plato, Theaetetus 176C (Fowler, 128-129). 
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desires and fears,” and causes us to be “slaves to its service.”29  While we have established that 
Origen views the body in a more positive light, there is still a sense both in Plato and Origen that 
that which is farther removed from the divine is less “real” and that this is especially true in 
regards to that which is considered evil. 
 This similarity between Origen and Plato, however, perhaps becomes more apparent in 
light of the Middle-Platonic inheritance that Origen received and how Plato was interpreted by 
the philosophers of Origen’s time.  For example, concerning Plotinus, Mark S.M. Scott notes 
that: 
Plotinus poses the question of whether evil “really exists.”  It cannot be classified as a Form, he 
says, but rather as the absence of every sort of good,” and as such it cannot have positive 
metaphysical status.  Plotinus, then defines evil as “privation” (στέρεσις) and “the lack of the good” 
(ή ἔλλειφις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ).  Since existence, emanating from the One, is fundamentally good, evil 
cannot “really exist,” since it does not participate in existence but rather vitiates being.  Thus, it 
must be defined negatively as “nonexistence” (μὴ ὀντι) and “nonbeing” (μή ὄν): “So it remains 
that if evil exists, it must be among non-existent things, as a sort of form of non-existence, and 
pertain to one of the things that are mingled with nonbeing or somehow share in non-being.30 
 
 It is apparent here that Plotinus and Origen conceive of evil in a remarkably similar 
manner, no doubt due to their shared Platonic inheritance.  For his part, Origen finds a scriptural 
basis upon which to pin the formulation of evil as non-being.  Thus he puts forth the 
interpretation of John 1:3’s “without him nothing was made” as showing that evil is “nothing” 
and that therefore God did not create evil.  
 
29 Plato, Phaedo 66A-67E (Fowler, 228-235). 
30 Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil, 29. 
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 What this tells us is that, for Origen, the fallen souls in his cosmology really chose to 
deprive themselves of God for something inferior – that of material desires – which do not 
satisfy or complete the soul in the infinite way that only God can.  This is why, in Origen’s 
theology, there is such a tension between the material and the godly, and why material desires 
can so easily give way to sin – precisely because material things are farther removed from 
spiritual things, the latter of which are more “real” in that they are closer to God who is truly real. 
 Origen seems to adopt a bit of Plato’s understanding of the cave motif.  For Origen, 
however, we must always remember that the material is still not evil in and of itself, but that does 
not mean the material is not inferior to the spiritual in a very real sense.  Yet in this way we see 
that, for Origen, by entering into and practicing the spiritual life, one is letting go of the material 
desires that give such easy access to “not being.”  As one progresses spiritually, and becomes 
deified, therefore, one is in a sense becoming more “real” or at least establishing themselves in 
closer and closer communion with that which is really real. 
 Thus we can find in Origen’s theodicy resemblances to the Platonic hierarchy of being, in 
which souls can progressively attain to a higher spiritual and ethereal state.  Meanwhile, Origen’s 
telos resembles Plotinus in that both anticipate a final state of beholding of God or the One, 
respectively. Yet Origen goes to great lengths to show how this final state is rooted in scripture, 







 As in Origen’s thought, just as the end mirrors the beginning, so in this thesis we arrive 
back to where we started, albeit hopefully having gained something of value in the process.  
After having explored the concepts of image, likeness, and participation, in the context of 
Origen’s theological anthropology and Christology (or perhaps better stated in Origen’s case, 
Logosology) we are left to define what is, for this formative Church thinker, deification and, 
furthermore, how does it relate to the philosophical and scriptural sources of his time? 
 We have touched on these questions throughout, and in doing so have cited experts in the 
field whose analyses of Origen’s thought have been instrumental in revealing the role and 
process of deification in his writings.  To conclude, we shall attempt not merely a synthesis of 
these scholarly opinions, but will also contribute our own assessment to the mix.  We shall 
additionally identify potential further areas of study, the research of which would bring fruit to 
the questions addressed in this thesis.  Finally, we shall offer what we believe the understanding 
of Origen’s theology of deification can offer contemporary Christian faithful.  
 If one thing can be said of Origen’s thought, based on past scholarly analysis, it is that it 
defies easy categorization.  For one thing, Origen covered so many topics and wrote so many 
works, not all of which are extant, that it can sometimes be difficult to get a handle on just what 
really this Church thinker had to say on any one in particular — particularly when we consider 
the more speculative theologizing side he was prone to display, especially in regards to 
metaphysical questions.  Yet it is also because he committed so many of his ideas to papyrus, 
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and because of his inclusion of his more experimental thinking, that we have more than enough 
to work with to form a sufficient idea of Origen’s concept of deification. 
 First, we can say with confidence that Origen never formulated a “doctrine of deification,” 
in the same sense in which doctrine would be formulated later on in the Church’s history.  That 
is to say, for Origen, there is never a time where Origen exclusively presents deification as “such 
and such a thing,” and explains why it is to be considered doctrine.  So in discussing Origen’s 
“doctrine of deification,” we must remember that Origen never would have thought of things in 
such a manner.  Here, using such a term merely helps to collect Origen’s ideas on deification 
under one roof, and thus to help in seeing what he specifically did and didn’t affirm about the 
process of becoming more like God, and how and to what extent this was a necessity in the life 
of the Christian believer.   
 Yet that Origen identifies deification as the telos of the Christian life is inescapable. If we 
could be so bold as to formulate a summarized doctrine of deification from Origen’s writing, it 
could perhaps be construed as follows: For Origen, only the saint was to be considered truly 
rational among human beings.  This was because only the saint, divinized by the Holy Spirit and 
free from all traces of sin, fully participated in, in so much as it is possible by a human being, the 
relationship of communion between God and man.  In as much as man was and is to be again, 
nous, through the turning of his psyche back under its influence via the consideration of spiritual 
matters and by practicing virtue, and thus to God, he images and participates in that which is 
Reason itself, the Logos.  The Logos in turn, is the archetype and true contemplator of the God, 
the Father, who is the source of all that is good, and from which nothing was not made.  By 
imaging and participating in the Logos, the spiritual subject also attains to the likeness of God, 
inasmuch as he receives grace and the vivacity with which he pursues God.  This likeness is the 
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actual deification of the spiritual participant, in that likeness consists of the divine qualities, 
although primarily that of reason, which God himself possesses.  Thus a saint, after death, 
receives a spiritual body and is eventually restored to a position of uninterrupted and 
unadulterated communion with God as nous, which is another way of saying that the spiritual 
subject forever enjoys a pure and intimate relationship of love with Love itself, along with all 
other believers. 
 Can we “calculate” the influence of the theological and philosophical roots of the above 
“doctrine” in a way that assigns certain proportions to say, Paul’s theological anthropology or 
Plato’s hierarchy of being?  One could certainly try, but despite a reliable outcome of such an 
endeavor almost certainly being unattainable, due to the intricacies of Origen’s work and the 
degrees to which he interweaves philosophical and theological concepts, we are still left with the 
reality that objectively putting forth how much Origen was a Christian, and how much he was a 
Platonist, is a debate which has not truly reached a consensus.  Instead, this debate, one could 
argue, has been bypassed by modern scholarship to focus on the merits and weaknesses of 
Origen’s views, from a Christian theological perspective.  Whether this is in regards to the 
question of evil, or how one should interpret the Letter to the Romans, for example, we will also 
take our cue from modern scholarship in assessing the contributions and merits of Origen’s 
“doctrine” for Christians today. 
 In what ways could Origen’s ideas surrounding deification contribute to current 
theological thought and thereby to Christian spirituality?  What are the merits of his theological 
deductions regarding image, likeness and participation?  A primary answer might be to say that 
Origen’s ideas can contribute to a renewed sense of anastiform living, as we discussed earlier in 
this thesis.  There is a different sense of the economy of the second person in the Trinity, in ways 
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different than say, Calvin’s or Anselm’s accounts.  The latter emphasize a satisfactory or penal 
substitutionary aspect of the Christ’s incarnation and resurrection and their role in rendering us 
adopted children of God, thus allowing us to enjoy life as God’s sons and daughters in spite of 
our lack of obedience to God.  While Origen also endorses substitutionary elements in his 
writings in regard to the Son, he is also in ways more abstract, tending to place emphasis on the 
son’s role as Logos.  This causes him to emphasize the Logos as archetype, and thus the 
formulaic expression of the divine exchange, that God became man so that men may become 
gods.   
 Thus the focus shifts to a restoration of union with the Logos which brings about a 
renewing of the life of the believer day by day.  There is an emphasis on spiritual progress in 
Origen’s works which is accelerated through persistence, virtue, and grace.  With this progress 
comes an increasingly deeper understanding into divine mysteries, along with “spiritual senses” 
which are mystical extensions of the ability of the believer to better understand, love and 
commune with God.   
These foci turn the believer’s attention and efforts towards an active, as opposed to 
passive, restoration of communion with God.  In this respect, there is also an incentive of various 
levels of spiritual progress that the believer can make, each carrying with it a type of 
participation in God.  Just as Origen describes various types of food and levels of maturity for 
the spiritual believer, so each believer is on a journey to God in which there is an interior ascent.  
It is this type of thinking which gives Origen’s doctrine of deification a resemblance to mystical 
spiritualities such as that of St. Teresa of Avila or St. John of the Cross.  They inspire the 
believer with the hope of continual progress with an end goal nothing short of complete 
sanctification.  Thus Origen stresses a high ideal of sanctity to be achieved but with the 
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assurance that this sanctity is within the realm of reach of everyone through stepwise progress, 
even if one is a sinner. 
The fact that Origen’s theology of deification is one of progression which is suitable for 
incorporation into a lived spirituality is noted by Joseph Trigg, here commenting on the 
relationship between grace and free will in Origen’s thinking, and how Origen’s concept of lived 
spirituality influenced Christian monasticism and asceticism:   
This way of relating human and divine activity in a continual process of human transformation 
provided the chief theoretical model for the Christian ascetic tradition.  It is thus the source of 
Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of epektasis, a continual straining toward God.  Recent studies have 
shown how pervasive Origen’s influence was on emerging Egyptian monasticism, including 
Antony of Egypt.  Through John Cassian, who imbibed this Origenist approach from Evagrius 
Ponticus, Origen’s approach to grace and free will became, even in the West, a standing 
alternative to Augustine’s approach, which tended to present them as mutually exclusive. We see 
an echo of this in the controversy over free will between Erasmus and Luther, since the former 
depended heavily on Origen’s Peri Archon.1 
 
 
 One may argue that Origen’s spiritual methodology is therefore bent towards Pelagianism 
and thus not compatible with God’s grace.  Yet again we could draw parallels to mystical 
theologies such as the Carmelite theologies specified above.  In these theologies, everything 
depends upon God’s grace, but it is up to the believer whether one accepts such graces and uses 
them to “ascend” to God.  Likewise, grace plays a similar role in Origen’s theology, and it is 
only as the Logos draws closer to the believer, that the believer can draw closer to God. 
 In these respects, Origen’s theology can provide reflections not only on the ideal of 
holiness and sanctification but also its accessibility to each Christian.  In some measure, Origen 
impresses upon us the natural end of each human being — to become deified in Christ — and 
how that deification makes communion with God increasingly more possible.  Just as in his 
Commentary on The Song of Songs, Origen identifies God’s relationship with the soul as a 
 
1Trigg, Origen: The Early Church Fathers, 63-64. We note here that we are not, however, in complete agreement 




meaning behind the symbolism of the intimacy shared between the Bride and the Bridegroom, so 
Origen’s deification emphasizes the need for an actively maintained and communicative 
relationship with God.   
 In addition to the merits that reflection on Origen’s doctrine of deification can provide to 
the Christian spirituality, there are also the merits that it can provide to ecumenical theology and 
comparative religion.  Comparisons have been drawn, for example, between Hindu religion and 
Plato and Plotinus; given the Platonic influence in Origen’s work, and the presence of themes 
such as deification and universal restoration, there is the potential for similar comparisons 
between Origen and Dharmic religious system.  From an ecumenical perspective, Origen has 
been recognized by Protestants, Orthodox and Catholics as foundational to Church thinking and 
thus ecumenical discussions on his doctrine of deification could enlighten contemporary views 
on deification as it is understood from various Christian perspectives. 
 Finally, we may be able to garner from Origen’s thinking renewed interpretations of 
scripture, especially those biblical texts frequently referred to in this thesis.  This especially 
concerns our analysis of Pauline texts, and a reading of Paul that emphasizes the progressive 
character of the sanctifying influence of Christ on the life of the Christian.  It also concerns the 
usage of image, likeness and participation, and rediscovered ways of understanding these themes 
as they appear in the Bible.  
 As we conclude this thesis, it is hoped that what has been conveyed above gives a better 
insight into both Origen’s doctrine of deification and the ways in which his concept of the deified 
Christian life compared with the philosophical and scriptural sources available to him.  In 
exploring this topic further, it would be helpful to additionally explore the reception of Origen’s 
doctrine of deification by later ecclesiastics and theologians, as well as its influence on the 
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development of monastic and ascetic traditions.  In this way, one might trace elements of 
Origen’s theology as it continued to have an influence upon later Church thought and practice, 
particularly as this regards eastern and western Christianity.  For now, we are content to end our 
present analysis with the following, that we may say with Origen: “Let us always, therefore, 
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